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CHAPTER 1 “INTRODUCTION”
It was in such a context that Trotsky scorned “papist-Quaker babble about the sanctity of human
life,” and Lenin approvingly quoted Machiavelli to the effect that “violence can only be met with
violence.”1

In 1937, following her unexpected arrest, Party member Eugenia Ginzburg languished in
a Soviet prison. Ginzburg’s cellmate, an old peasant woman, did not understand why she had been
arrested by officers of the NKVD, Stalin’s secret police. When Ginzburg asked the old woman
why she was being held, the woman, more than a little perplexed, said that the officers accused
her of being a “tractorist.” A tractorist? thought Ginzburg. “But as God’s my witness,” the woman
continued, “I never went near one of those cursed things… They don’t put old women like me on
tractors.” Ginzburg finally realized that the poor old woman, an illiterate peasant with absolutely
no understanding of political issues, was in fact being held as a Trotskyist, a supporter of the
opposition and therefore a counterrevolutionary enemy of the state.2
By late 1937, NKVD officers flooded the Gulag and prisons throughout the Soviet Union
with Party members like Ginzburg and peasants like the unnamed old woman. They shared cells
with former kulaks, priests, family members of the “socially dangerous,” and other “anti-Soviet
elements.” They came from both the cities and the countryside. They came from the Baltic states,
Central Asia, Siberia, and beyond. This was an all-encompassing purge, known today as the Great
Terror.
The mass violence and repression that engulfed the Soviet Union in the 1930s was marked
by two consecutive waves of horrific terror. The first wave washed away 40,000 Party elites and
25,000 Soviet citizens because of their family ties or friendships. These ordinary people, the
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“other” victims of the Great Terror, have been the central focus of social and cultural historians
since the 1970s. The second wave, immeasurably more destructive, which included the mass
operations and the national operations, consumed 625,000 people.3 By the time the terror subsided,
NKVD agents had executed 690,000 men, women, and children.4
Those specifically targeted during the first wave of purges, the “old guard” of Party elites,
included high ranking members of the Politburo, military officers, industrial managers, and former
leaders of the NKVD.5 The purge of the old guard quickly became a public spectacle, with show
trials covered across the globe by the international press. Accused of elaborate plots and
conspiracies to murder Stalin and overthrow the Party, many of the founding fathers of the
Bolshevik regime lost their lives in this first wave of terror. As the show trials both enthralled and
horrified citizens throughout the Soviet Union, local Party leaders pleaded for vigilance,
encouraging peasants and factory workers to “unmask” the enemies who sought to undermine the
revolution. Fear and paranoia reigned in urban areas like Moscow and Leningrad, as workers
denounced one another and families were torn apart. In contrast, the second wave was veiled in
secrecy. For decades, a comprehensive picture of the mass operations and national operations
remained inaccessible.6 These victims, generally ordinary men and women with no political ties
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The mass operations began on 30 July, 1937, when the NKVD issued Order 00447. This order targeted former
kulaks, criminals, and anti-Soviet elements. NKVD agents executed approximately 380, 000 people because of
Order 00447. The national operations began on 9 July, 1937, when the NKVD issued Order 00485. This order
targeted Polish nationals. Similar orders followed, targeting other diaspora nationalities. NKVD agents executed
approximately 245,000 people during the national operations. See chapter four for specific details on these
operations.
4
For the number of victims, see footnote 36.
5
This group is collectively known as the nomenklatura.
6
For decades, the Great Terror was seen as a series of show trials and army purges that targeted Party elites. See
Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 107. Nikita
Khrushchev’s “secret speech” in 1956, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich in 1962,
Robert Conquest’s The Great Terror in 1968, and Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago in 1973-1975 all helped
Western scholars better understand the scale and scope of the violence. See Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A
History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 261.
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or designs, were labeled “enemies of the people” and “anti-Soviet elements” by Stalin and his
leadership group.
There is now a consensus among historians about what happened during the Great Terror.
There is no consensus, however, regarding how and why it happened. A survey of the
historiography reveals two distinct approaches to understanding the Terror. Whereas one approach
argues for order and a central orchestration of events, the other focuses on chaos, contingency, and
mass participation. The former is overwhelmingly practiced by political historians and the latter
by social and cultural historians.

Historiography
Sheila Fitzpatrick is one of the leading scholars of the Soviet Union and Stalinism. She is
also among the first to separate herself from the old paradigm of Soviet studies that focused
exclusively on Stalin and ignored the lives of millions of ordinary Soviet citizens. Fitzpatrick’s
bottom-up approach revealed entirely new and unexpected vistas, emphasizing the importance of
social forces in trying to understand the phenomenon of Stalinism. In 1999, she published
Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times, Soviet Russia in the 1930s, arguing
that numerous causes resulted in the Great Terror. It was an environment plagued with mass
hysteria, where “networks and conspiracies” lurked behind every corner. Stress and strain followed
from rapid industrialization and collectivization. There was extreme tension within the Party after
the assassination of Leningrad Party boss Sergei Kirov, along with apprehension and anxiety
regarding the possibility of a second world war.7 Fitzpatrick contends that it is a mistake to seek

7
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out reason and rationality, arguing that “Soviet terror was random,” and that this randomness
precluded any possibility of premeditated design.8
Others, following Fitzpatrick’s lead, have put forth similar arguments. In Inventing the
Enemy: Denunciation and Terror in Stalin’s Russia, Wendy Z. Goldman explores the behavior of
ordinary people in five Moscow factories during the tumultuous episode of the Great Terror.
Goldman argues that the agents of terror were not only NKVD officials, but also ordinary men and
women who actively participated in generating and prolonging the violence. The NKVD officers
made the arrests, but it was the people who “penned denunciations, wrote defamatory articles in
the factory and wall newspapers, and accused shop heads of causing accidents.” 9 Goldman
demonstrates the absurdly circular nature of the terror – just as events affected the daily lives of
people, so too did the daily lives of people affect events. Like Fitzpatrick, Goldman argues that
the Great Terror was a multicausal and multilayered phenomenon. The whole of society, she
argues, participated in the hunt for “masked” enemies.10 “It was a profoundly violent process,”
Goldman writes, “whereby the country began to resemble a body in the throes of some terrible
autoimmune disease, attacking and destroying its own organs, nervous system, flesh, and blood.”11
In his analysis of the Great Terror, Stephen F. Cohen speaks of “a multiplicity of social,
cultural, and political causes.”12 Emphasizing the chaotic, elemental nature of the terror, Cohen
refers to the phenomenon as “the crimson madness.” Cohen argues that criminal complicity rests
not only with Stalin, the Politburo, and the NKVD, but also with Party and state officials, petty

8

Fitzpatrick, 192.
Wendy Z. Goldman, Inventing the Enemy: Denunciation and Terror in Stalin’s Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011), 20.
10
See Sheila Fitzpatrick, Tear Off the Masks!: Identity and Imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2005).
11
Goldman, 297.
12
Stephen F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics & History Since 1917 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1985), 22.
9

5

informers, and slanderers.13 In Cohen’s analysis, the purges were irrational, wrecking and retarding
many of the achievements of 1929-1936. For Cohen, Stalinism represented a withdrawal from
Leninism, “a radical departure from Bolshevik programmatic thinking.”14 Stalin broke free from
the ideology of Marx and Lenin, Cohen argues, creating his own path for the Soviet Union,
sacrificing millions of his own citizens in the process.
Robert W. Thurston also focuses on the actions of ordinary people throughout the purges.
The Terror, for Thurston, was the tragic result of mass anxiety and paranoia. He highlights “a
distressing human inclination to panic and to believe in plots, which then must be crushed at the
cost of violating individuals’ rights.”15 A fear of secret agents and spies working with foreign
nations and plotting the downfall of the Soviet Union affected everyone from Stalin to the millions
of ordinary citizens who participated in the process of terror. Thurston writes, “the interaction of
society and a sometimes hysterical leadership produced repulsive acts in the late 1930s – though
the public often considered these steps necessary to eliminate a grave threat.”16 Stalin was only
reacting to the madness, Thurston argues, not creating it. It was not until much later, after so many
had lost their lives, that “the leadership regained some of its senses.”17
This notion of chaos and reaction is echoed in much of the contemporary historiography.
Some scholars, such as J. Arch Getty, argue that Stalinism was defined more by chaos and
inefficiency than by lethal cunning and political savvy.18 Getty contends that Stalin had no master
plan to carry out the Terror. In an interview on Sean’s Russia Blog, Getty states that the mass
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violence of the Great Terror followed from a fearful and insecure regime. Stalin and his leadership
group were “afraid of everything.”19 They suffered from an insecurity complex that forced them
to resort to violence and repression. Stalin and his cronies were profoundly reactive, Getty argues,
reacting to the chaos that surrounded them, to the fears that threatened to plunge them into oblivion.
What we see from these historians is a commitment to the methodologies employed by the
early revisionists. The emphasis is on social forces, on randomness, chaos, and contingency. They
argue for mass participation in extending and augmenting the Terror. They portray Stalin as
reactive, paranoid, and impotent – lacking real power and control, forced to resort to violence and
repression.20 An alternative approach, practiced by many of today’s most renowned political
historians who have rejected the revisionist thesis, emphasize the manifestation of political
ideology. They demonstrate order, rationality, and express directives. Furthermore, they reject the
notion of mass participation. Regarding Stalin, they argue that his actions were premeditated and
proactive.
In The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991, Martin Malia writes,
“it takes a great ideal to produce a great crime.”

21

For Stalin, the great ideal was socialism, and

the great crime the purges of the 1930s. As Malia argues throughout his book, socialism does not
designate an empirical reality, but rather an idea of a possibility, a radiant utopian future. Stalin’s
vision of a socialist utopia in Russia involved a radical transformation of society, resulting in a
kingdom of harmony and equality. Stalin had specific goals: to overcome military, cultural,
industrial, and agricultural backwardness, and to realize Marxism by creating a nation of workers
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rather than peasants and small businessmen. His methods for achieving these goals included rapid
industrialization, collectivization, cultural revolution, and mass purges. By analyzing the effects
of the Terror, Malia demonstrates purpose and design rather than chaos and randomness. As a
result of the purges, the army, the Party, and industry were completely renovated and rejuvenated.
1,500,000 new “thirty-something” men and women took over key positions. These were products
of the cultural revolution, pupils of dialectical materialism, and graduates of technical and
engineering schools. Stalin had brought forth the “new Soviet man,” homo sovieticus,22 by washing
away the old guard. And this was the essential reason for the purges. As Malia writes, the ultimate
rationale of the Great Terror was for Stalin to give himself a new Party and a new corps of cadres
in every field of national activity.23
In 2010, Timothy Snyder published his critically acclaimed Bloodlands: Europe Between
Hitler and Stalin, arguing that the mass murders of the Great Terror were express directives and
explicit policies, political in nature, with the central goal of manifesting a utopian ideology. What
mattered for Stalin, above all else, was the building and defense of socialism in Russia.24 The most
effective and efficient way to realize the goal was the implementation of mass killing policies,
eliminating from the body politic hundreds of thousands of anti-Soviet elements. These policies
were “purposeful,”25 and, according to the Bulgarian-French historian Tsvetan Todorov, “given
the goals they set for themselves, the choices of Stalin and Hitler were, alas, rational.”26 Snyder
presents Stalin as a man not reacting to present dilemmas, but proactively employing policies
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designed to manifest his ideological vision. Stalin was looking to the future, and he knew that only
a radical social upheaval could secure that future.
One of the more overlooked modern Russian historians is A. L. Unger. In 1969 Unger
wrote an essay entitled “Stalin’s Renewal of the Leading Stratum: A Note on the Great Purge.”
Although for decades the revisionists denied the validity of such arguments, much of the
contemporary historiography of politically-minded scholars builds on Unger’s work. Unger
believed that the desire for modernization played the central role in the purges. As a result of the
purges, Stalin’s policies created “a new leading stratum.” Educated specialists replaced nearly 60%
of the Party. In “an era of rapid industrialization, requiring technically qualified and politically
reliable specialist cadres,” these policies were essential for the survival of the Party. 27 Stalin,
fearful of his nation’s ability to meet the challenges of the modern world, said his regime “proved
to be unarmed and absolutely backward, scandalously backward, in the matter of providing
industry with a certain minimum of experts devoted to the cause of the working class.”28 Unger
argues that the primary concern of Stalin and his leadership group was “to find sufficient cadres
to run Soviet Russia’s expanding industrial empire and its ancillary services.”29 Here again we see
purpose. We see a goal and a means to achieve that goal.
In 2009, Paul Hagenloh published Stalin’s Police: Public Order and Mass Repression in
the USSR, 1926-1941. Hagenloh argues that Stalin, mindful of potential conflicts with Germany
and Japan, was concerned with numerous anti-Soviet contingents and non-Russian populations.
Stalin and his advisors, led by Nikolai Ezhov, designed the mass operations and national operations
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to rid the Soviet Union of a potential social base of insurrection.30 They believed they could define
and shape populations by identifying undesirable cohorts and eliminating them from the body
politic. Certain populations were identified as “dangerous elements.” If they had the potential to
revolt, to fight alongside enemy states, or to undermine the Soviet Union from within, then they
were quickly and ruthlessly repressed. One of Hagenloh’s most valuable contributions to the
literature is his evaluation of the arguments for mass participation. He argues that in both rural and
urban areas the mass operations and national operations were essentially police operations, that
there was little reliance on denunciations and other forms of popular participation. Furthermore,
Hagenloh states that the social historians who dominated the field between the 1970s and the 1990s
exclusively and intentionally focused on social activism. Popular participation, Hagenloh
concludes, had no influence or impact on the mass operations or national operations. These
operations resulted from the express orders of Stalin and were carried out entirely by the NKVD.31
Oleg V. Khlevniuk wrote Master of the House: Stalin and His Inner Circle in 2009.
Khlevniuk argues that the Great Terror was centrally orchestrated, “a series of purposeful and
carefully planned centralized operations.”32 Stalin had two specific goals: destroy a potential “fifth
column” and purge the leading cadres. The latter would eliminate the old guard, many of whom
had been involved in opposition movements and could no longer be trusted by Stalin, and who by
1936 had lost their “revolutionary zeal.”33 The former, the potential “fifth column,” were ordinary
citizens, but they were also, in many cases, former members of parties hostile to the Bolsheviks.
More importantly, after revolution, civil war, collectivization, dekulakization, and years of
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successive Party purges, they represented the millions of people, and their families, who had been
harmed in some way by the Bolsheviks. They could not be trusted if war broke out, and Stalin was
convinced that a second great war was inevitable. These millions of people would turn against
Stalin and the Soviet Union – they would unite to form a “fifth column.” Add to this number the
millions of religious believers who could never accept Bolshevik ideology and the millions of
national contingents who felt they had no place in Stalin’s Soviet Union, and the implementation
of the Great Terror appears both rational and necessary. The policies and practices that resulted in
the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people were devised and directed by Stalin and his inner
circle – Molotov, Voroshilov, Kagonovich, Zhadnov, and of course Ezhov, the “bloody dwarf” –
and not the result of mass participation. As Khlevniuk writes, “theories about the elemental,
spontaneous nature of the terror, about a loss of central control over the course of the mass
repression, and about the role of regional leaders in initiating the terror simply are not supported
by the historical record.”34
The historiography demonstrates two often conflicting approaches and methodologies. One
group, usually but not always made up of social and cultural historians, influenced by the
revisionist movement, focusses on social forces and popular participation. In this view, the Great
Terror is marked by elemental chaos and mass anxiety. The other group, generally made up of
political historians, focuses on a centrally orchestrated attempt to achieve specific regime goals.
Express directives were carried out, rapidly and efficiently, by NKVD officers. The Great Terror,
for these historians, is defined by a monstrous reason and rationality, stressing that the regime was
in complete control from beginning to end.

34
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Whether the Great Terror has been presented as a spontaneous response to stress and strain
or as calculated program designed to rejuvenate the Party and protect the Soviet Union from
potential enemies, it is important to note that, paradoxically, both sides have revealed versions of
the truth. This strange conclusion follows from the nature of the Great Terror and the way different
historians have approached it. For those who have focused on the show trials, urban reactions,
media coverage, mass hysteria, and mass participation, there certainly was chaos and social
activism. Nearly 25,000 people lost their lives because of a coworker’s denunciation or because a
family member or friend was thought to be an “enemy of the people.” Party leaders encouraged
participation and newspapers fueled the fires on a daily basis. The world watched as top Party
members during the show trials admitted their “plots” to destroy Stalin and restore capitalism.
They watched in horror and dismay as the Bolsheviks put to death 40,000 Party elites.35 But this
first wave represents only 9% of the total number of executions during the Great Terror. Most
contemporary political historians have focused on the second wave, the mass and national
operations. Some historians, such as Khlevniuk, have argued that the Great Terror actually began
on 2 July 1937, a year after the first Moscow show trial. On this day the Politburo announced its
resolution to repress “anti-Soviet elements.” NKVD Order 00447 soon followed, and the mass
operations began. During these operations, secrecy was preserved and maintained. NKVD officers,
following orders that were signed by Ezhov and approved by Stalin, arrested and either executed
or sent to the Gulag nearly a million people. 625,000 were executed throughout the course of the
mass and national operations, an astounding 91% of total executions for the Great Terror.36
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Western newspapers extensively covered the Terror. See chapter 4 for examples of some of the coverage.
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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Towards a New Understanding of the Great Terror
“The Great Terror: Violence, Ideology, and the Building of Stalin’s Soviet Empire” is a study
of the confluence of terror and ideology in the Soviet Union during Stalin’s rule. I argue that the
intersection of ideology and circumstance, both foreign and domestic, resulted in the Great Terror.
To understand the 1930s in the Soviet Union, and the phenomenon of the Great Terror in particular,
it is necessary to expand one’s scale and scope, examining the global evolution of radical ideology
following the First World War. By placing the Great Terror within both a global and a panEuropean context, it becomes evident that rather than being a phenomenon unique to the Soviet
experiment, modern states around the world employed mass violence and repression throughout
the interwar period. The Great Terror can neither be disconnected from the practices of modern
statecraft nor separated from other key features of Stalinism, such as collectivization,
industrialization, and cultural revolution.
Stalin’s political development during the Civil War period, which mirrored the radicalization
and militarization of the Bolsheviks, and which has been largely ignored by historians, is also
indicative of the blood purges that would engulf the Soviet Union in the 1930s. As early as 1918,
Stalin and the Bolsheviks were already using mass terror and repression, unleashing a rampage of
bloody slaughter on civilian populations during the Red Terror when the Cheka executed an
estimated 6,000 “enemies” within a two-month period. Stalin personally allowed hundreds of
prisoners to die of starvation and ordered the executions of hundreds more in Tsaritsyn. He called
for “open, mass, systematic terror against the bourgeoisie.”37 Trotsky believed that Stalin was
molded by his experience in the Civil War.

37
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Much of the historiography of the Great Terror analyzes the purges in isolation, failing to
connect the events of 1936-1938 to the other central “pillars” of Stalinism, and failing to place the
violence and repression in larger pan-European and global context. When examined as a united
revolutionary system, and not simply as an isolated aberration, a more comprehensive and nuanced
picture emerges. Stalin’s ultimate goal was the building of a socialist utopia in Russia, a communist
empire. To manifest this goal, he initiated four major programs of social, cultural, and political
transformation – the “four pillars of Stalinism”: collectivization, industrialization, cultural
revolution, and mass purges. Only by connecting the events of 1936-1938 with Stalin’s three other
revolutionary programs is it possible to understand the Great Terror. And only by analyzing the
impact of the mass destruction and devastation of the Great War, the perilous rise of fascism, and
the threat of capitalist encirclement is it conceivable to put forth an argument with the potential to
express the full range of causality.
Stalinism must be studied as a total system, and this system needs to be analyzed as a whole,
not broken up into isolated programs and processes. “The Great Terror” makes no distinction
between Stalin the man and Stalinism the political system. The ideas that Stalin expressed in his
writings and speeches led to particular choices – to institute collectivization, to pursue a policy of
rapid industrialization, to initiate a cultural revolution, and to support NKVD orders that resulted
in the executions of hundreds of thousands of people. Over time, beginning in the 1920s, the
choices made by Stalin in response to problems and challenges manifested in the political system
referred to as Stalinism. This system was the ultimate realization of a synthesis of ideas and ideals,
practices and policies, or more specifically, ideology.
This work advances the scholarship of modern Russian history, as well as modern European
history, because it explores the Great Terror in a pan-European context. This is the only way to
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reveal the essence of Stalinism – as a modern civilization, not a totalitarian dictatorship. It
challenges much of the contemporary historiography, particularly the social and cultural historians
who have argued for chaos, contingency, and mass popular participation. Additionally, it
complements studies on both fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Most importantly, it contributes a
new analysis on the connection between political ideology and state violence.
Chapter 1 analyzes Soviet ideology, clarifying distinctions between Marxism, Leninism, and
Stalinism. Chapter 2 focusses on the foreign and domestic circumstances that threatened the future
of the Party and the Soviet Union, examining the crisis of interwar Europe, the rise of fascist Italy,
and the menace of Nazi Germany. Chapter 3, using a narrative methodology, details the events of
the Great Terror. My conclusion reveals the results of the Great Terror, arguing that the creation
of the Soviet Empire, which emerged as a world superpower following the Second World War,
was only possible because of the choices made by Stalin and his inner circle during the 1930s. In
addition to examining a wide range of secondary sources, throughout most of this study I rely on
an intellectual history approach, by employing a textual analysis of primary sources.
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CHAPTER 2 “SOVIET IDEOLOGY AND THE ENEMIES OF HISTORY”
History knows no scruples and no hesitation. Inert and unerring, she flows towards her
goal. At every bend in her course she leaves the mud which she carries and the corpses of
the drowned. History knows her way. She makes no mistakes. He who has not absolute
faith in History does not belong in the Party’s ranks.1

Stepan Prokhorovich Stashchenko worked as a mechanic at the Kiev Fiber Factory in
Soviet Ukraine. In Barracks 10, Room 6 of the company dormitory, Stepan lived with his wife,
Aleksandra Andreevna. On the evening of 10 November 1937, NKVD officers arrived at the
dormitory and arrested Stepan, charging him with the crime of “anti-Soviet agitation.” Stepan had
once been a kulak, one of the Soviet Union’s wealthier peasants, and his crime, the interrogators
told him, occurred several years earlier, long before he ever imagined that one day he would be
working at a fiber factory in Kiev. When Stalin first initiated his collectivization program,
disrupting the lives of millions of peasants throughout the Soviet Union, Stepan supposedly
remarked, “The collective farms won’t last in any case, because the Soviet government is unstable,
war is inevitable, the government will be smashed, and Germany will come to power.” He
categorically denied the charge, but the arresting officers had already made up their minds, and
because no material evidence was required to prove his guilt, Stepan’s fate had already been sealed.
Four weeks later, on 9 December 1937, shortly before midnight, an officer took Stepan from his
cell and led him to the basement of the prison where he was being held. The officer removed his
pistol from its holster and fired a shot into the nape of Stepan’s neck. Once Stepan had fallen to
the floor, the officer fired two more shots, making sure the prisoner was dead. Other officers then

1

Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon (New York: Scribner, 1941), 43-44.
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loaded Stepan’s body in the back of a truck and drove to Bykivnia, where they dumped the body
into a pit with thousands of other rotting corpses.2

Esoteric Knowledge
Martin Malia wrote, “The key to understanding the Soviet phenomenon is ideology.”3
From the founding of the Bolshevik Party to the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, ideology was the
quintessence, the driving force, the foundation upon which generations of Communist leaders
constructed the Soviet Union. Stepan’s murder, like the murders of hundreds of thousands of others
during the Great Terror, was the direct result of ideology intersecting with geopolitical
circumstances. Driven by a will to create and defend socialism in Russia, ideology was the guiding
light and inspiration for Joseph Stalin’s policies and practices of the 1930s.4 For him, the revolution
did not end when the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917; Stalin continued employing wartime
measures well into the late 1930s, seeking to eliminate those he believed to be
counterrevolutionaries and enemies of the state.
Scholars have stressed the importance of ideology in the historical development of modern
Russia.5 The Bolsheviks employed considerable resources to disseminate their ideology,
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Hiroaki Kuromiya, The Voices of the Dead: Stalin’s Great Terror in the 1930s (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2007), 99-100, 20-21.
3
Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: The Free Press, 1994),
16.
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In this paper, my focus is on the Great Terror. As a result, I am dealing primarily with the connection between
ideology and violence. But mass repression is only one aspect of Stalin’s policies of the 1930s. As demonstrated in
works such as Stephen Kotkin’s Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as Civilization, state building and the creation of a
new type of society occupied the highest priority. The blood purges were meant to safeguard the Party’s ultimate
goal of building socialism in Russia. To fully understand the Great Terror, it is necessary to be mindful of this goal
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constructing an enormous propaganda machine, with 50,000 activists by 1918 controlling
newspapers, posters, films, and agitation trains.6 For leading Party members as well as ordinary
citizens, ideology was a living force, providing meaning and purpose, directing action and
influencing behavior. In the Soviet Union, individual action, or agency, was produced by and
dynamically interacted with ideology.7 Bolshevism shrouded itself with ideology. From the
revolutionary symbolism inherent in the red flag, suggesting and evoking thoughts of life-blood
and heroic sacrifice, to the sacred texts of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, the prevailing idea expressed
was that the Party possessed a consecrated, esoteric knowledge – the scientific worldview of
historical and dialectical materialism, the Marxist-Leninist ideology.8
I argue that ideology is the driving force of history. As an assemblage of ideas and ideals
grounded in explicit practices, ideology impelled the Great Terror. I do not suggest a dichotomy
between ideas and circumstances, but rather an interconnectedness and mutual inclusiveness. On
its own, ideology, although potentially offensive and objectionable, is generally innocuous, but
becomes a dynamic, and often deadly force when intersected with volatile geopolitical and
domestic circumstances. Demanding a response, circumstances activate ideology, generating the
practices and policies that ensure the realization of ideas and ideals.9 Circumstances also transform
ideologies, as seen in the Russian Civil War, when Bolshevism transformed from a Russianized
Marxism into a radicalized and militarized Leninism.10 A similar process occurred during the Great
Terror, when the circumstances of the 1930s transformed Leninism into Stalinism. The vison
6
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remained the same – the realization of a socialist society in Russia – but the circumstances
necessitated dissimilar and distinct policies and practices.11 From Marxism to Leninism to
Stalinism, there occurred both subtle and profound changes in ideas and applications. The
question, however, is not if Leninism was a departure from Marxism, or if Stalin was an aberration,
but rather what were the particular circumstances that resulted in Stalinism and how did this variant
of Soviet ideology contribute to the Great Terror.

“the lifeblood of revolution”
What is ideology? The meaning of the word seems to change depending on who is using
it and the context in which it is being used. Despite the challenges in establishing a concise
definition, it is a crucial feature of political life, allowing people to make sense of the world and
enabling them to interpret facts, events, and social phenomena.12 In its most basic sense, ideology
is a set of ideas, beliefs, opinions, and values that guide public policy and organize the political
community.13 Ideology, as a vital feature of political life and a powerful tool of political discourse,
is eternally linked with politics. When seeking to establish historical causation, it is more
appropriate to think in terms of political ideologies rather than exploring an either ideology or
politics scenario.14
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One of the most significant complications for the modern Russian historian is
characterizing ideology and explaining its role in Soviet history. 15 Modern ideologies are
“codified, disseminated, and inculcated, often on a mass scale.”16 They are “outlooks deriving
from disseminated doctrine,” but when it comes to Soviet studies, ideology is often a problem and
not a solution.17 This is why it is necessary to not only clarify a working definition, but also to
acknowledge the complexity inherent in such a misunderstood and contested concept.
Ideology is both a vision of an ideal society and a set of methods employed to realize that
vision.18 It operates within concrete historical circumstances, changing over time and space,
reacting and responding in different ways.19 As expressions of both idea and application,
ideologies are neither abstract conceptions nor static value systems. Ideology played a ubiquitous
role in the Soviet Union, providing Soviet leaders with the vision of their ideal communist future
and the practices and policies that would allow them to construct that future.
Historian Arno J. Mayer argues that ideology is “the lifeblood of revolution.”20 Mayer
defines ideology as a collective worldview consisting of ideas and principles, expressed in
numerous forms, including written and spoken, but also through symbols and rituals.21 To realize
these ideas and principles, action is required. Ideology is action-oriented, employing specific
practices designed to actualize political ideals. Many scholars have defined ideology as “political
theory especially designed to direct political conduct and practices.”22
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The most important feature of ideology is that it is observable in concrete action and
empirically evident activity.23 Ideas are expressed in actions.24 With this understanding,
explorations of ideologies must be based on empirical data, because they concern concrete
manifestations of political thought.25 Ideology is not the obscure and nebulous ramblings of
academic theorists. As the union of idea and action, thought and practice, the study of ideology is
the most important method historians have for understanding the causation behind historical
phenomena. One reason for this is because ideology transcends divisions between political, social,
and cultural history. Ideology is the driving force behind them all, inspiring and affecting all the
various levels of a society and all the systems and structures that make up that society.26
This understanding of ideology, as action-oriented, is crucial for exploring Lenin, the
revolutionary period, and the age of Stalin. For Lenin, theory and practice were “inextricably
linked.”27 The same was certainly true for Stalin, as every policy he initiated – collectivization,
rapid industrialization, cultural revolution, and the Great Terror – was fundamentally grounded in
his understanding of and devotion to Marxism-Leninism.

Marxism – “by means of rifles, bayonets, and cannons”
Based on my definition of ideology – an assemblage of ideas and ideals grounded in
explicit practices and policies – Marxism seems more like political philosophy than ideology. In
works like the Manifesto of the Communist Party, there is a theoretical interpretation of History,
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but not a set of concrete practices that would bring forth its next stage. 28 When Karl Marx and
Fredrick Engels wrote their Manifesto in 1847, Russia was an agrarian society, not yet
industrialized, and defined by a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional diversity. The Manifesto
argued that History moved through stages of development, with each stage marked by opposing
forces that resolved in higher states, moving humanity forward to its ultimate destiny and most
advanced stage of perfection. The feudal age, for example, saw the opposing forces of masters and
serfs lead to the epoch of capitalism, where the two opposing forces were the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat. In every stage, the driving force was class struggle – the oppressor and the oppressed,
the exploiter and the exploited, locked in an epic struggle for survival. Violence and revolution
often powered the transformation from one stage to the next, as the French Revolution moved
History from the age of feudalism to the age of capitalism.
Marx and Engels defined the bourgeoisie as the class of modern capitalists. They were the
owners of the means of production (the factories, machines, and equipment) and the employers of
wage labor. Their historical purpose was to move civilization from seclusion and self-sufficiency
to globalization and to subject the country to towns and cities, rescuing populations from “the
idiocy of rural life.”29 All nations would be forced to industrialize or face extinction at the hands
of the bourgeois capitalists. Their defining characteristic was a brutal exploitation of the workers,
the proletariat, the class of modern wage laborers who sold their labor in order to survive. They
were nothing more than an appendage of the machine, slaves of the bourgeoisie. Their work was
dull and monotonous, and their wages were unbearably low. But like the bourgeoisie, the

28

Following Koestler, Arendt (in The Origins of Totalitarianism), and others, I am capitalizing “History” to stress its
importance in Soviet ideology as a personified force with a will and telos all its own.
29
Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marxists Internet Archive, 1848.
<www.marxists.org> (July 8, 2017).

22

proletariat also had a historical purpose to fulfill. As urban populations grew, the proletariat would
increase in number, begin to form trade unions, and eventually organize into a political party.
In time, the proletariat would violently overthrow their bourgeois oppressors, destroying
all existing social conditions and moving History into its next and highest stage, socialism: “the
violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat.” 30 This
was inevitable. The socialists would then abolish private property, eradicate religious practices,
and bring to an end national differences and antagonisms. Civilization would become a communist
utopia, where class struggle would no longer exist because there would no longer be any classes –
all would be equal. This would be an age of harmony and justice.31
Michael Freeden, a leading authority on the subject of ideology, calls communism a
“perverted offshoot of the socialist tradition.”32 Most modern Marxists make similar distinctions,
separating socialist theory from the violence and brutality of Stalinism and Maoism. But many
scholars and historians see the seeds of terror evident in the writings of Marx and Engels. French
philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty wrote that Marxism “is a theory of violence and a justification
of terror.”33 Marx was well aware of the role violence played in all major historical changes, noting
that throughout history “conquest, enslavement, murder-cum-robbery, in short Gewalt (force,
violence) play[ed] a preeminent role.”34 Marx and Engels believed that to reach and defend the
next and highest stage of historical development, socialism, Gewalt would necessarily play a
leading role. The proletariat would violently rise up against their oppressors, fulfilling the logic of
History and redeeming humanity. This was the orthodoxy set down by Marx and Engels. 35
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In his work On Authority, Engels openly advocated the use of terror. Speaking of
revolution, he said, “one part of the population imposes its will upon the other part by means of
rifles, bayonets, and cannons.” And when it came to defending the revolution, “the victorious party
must maintain its rule by means of the terror which its arms inspire in the reactionaries.” 36 The
historical theory of Marx and Engels, a theory advocating mass exclusion, was practically applied
by Lenin and Stalin on the ground level in the Red Terror and the Great Terror. For both Lenin
and Stalin, the words of Marx were clear and concise, not open to debate or interpretation: “there
is only one way in which the murderous death agonies of the old society and the bloody birth
throes of the new society can be shortened, simplified and concentrated, and that way is
revolutionary terror.”37
The socialist society described by Marx and Engels is a world peopled by a politically
conscious proletariat. Other groups have no place in the socialist future; they will simply “decay
and disappear.”38 The peasants are not revolutionary, but rather conservative and reactionary. And
as rural communities gave way to industrial cities, the class of peasants would be replaced by an
army of urban workers. They would eventually disappear into the sands of time. So too would the
small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, and the artisan. The most dangerous class, the
lumpenproletariat, the “social scum” and “passively rotting mass,” would, like the others, wither
away and die.39 These individuals, according to Marx and Engels, were the lowest of the low, the
criminals, beggars, prostitutes, and thieves. They are incapable of achieving consciousness, so they
too are excluded from the next stage of History. Because religion would be abolished, the future
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had no place for priests and clergy. Socialism is a world without peasants, criminals, small
businessmen, and religious believers. Society is made up of educated workers, united in purpose
and resolve. And there are no longer multitudes of individuals with their own cultures, beliefs, and
values. Nationalities and national identities would dissolve and merge into the collective, socialist
body; into a homogenous proletariat identity.
Much of this sounds like a natural and organic process, a vision of progress where certain
social groups are either naturally transformed or slowly disappear over time. This is certainly a
plausible argument based on a reading of the Manifesto alone. In this particular work, notions of
direct violence are specifically focused on the bourgeoisie. But a closer reading of other works,
when read alongside the Manifesto, suggest not a slow and natural process, but rather a passionate
appeal for violence and exclusion. When Marx speaks of the death agonies of the old society, he
is arguing for the elimination of all that represents the old-world order, including specific social
groups that have no role to play in the new-world order. These groups will naturally vanish and
decay over time, but to shorten and simplify the process, revolutionary terror is necessary.40
Furthermore, the social groups in question – the middle class, for example, represented by
shopkeepers, artisans, peasants, and small manufacturers – is conservative and not revolutionary.
The lumpenproletariat is reactionary.41 As conservatives and reactionaries, these individuals
present a direct threat to the proletariat. It would be a dire mistake to allow History to naturally
take its course, as these groups and individuals would fight to the death, preventing the proletariat
from establishing their dictatorship. As Engels cautioned, the rule of the proletariat would not
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come by patiently awaiting the promised utopia; victory could only be secured by using violence
and terror against reactionary forces.42

Leninism – “the tribune of the people”
In 1899, fifty years after the writing of the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Vladimir
Lenin published “Our Programme,” his interpretation of the doctrines of Marx and Engels. Lenin,
and other Marxists, believed that Marxism transformed socialism from a utopian fantasy into a
pragmatic science. But Marx’s theory had only laid the foundational stone, providing the general
guiding principles. It still needed to be developed and elaborated. For Lenin, class struggle meant
both economic struggle against the capitalists and political struggle against the state. The task of
men like Lenin, educated and socially aware, was to form a vanguard that would lead and organize
the class struggle of the proletariat. The goal would be the conquest of political power by the
proletariat and the creation of a socialist society.43
A few years later, in 1902, Lenin wrote “What is to Be Done?” further developing his
revolutionary ideas. The central problem for the proletariat was a lack of consciousness, an utter
blindness of their oppression and enslavement. Consciousness, Lenin believed, must be brought to
the working class from without, by a group of professional revolutionaries, the vanguard that he
alluded to in “Our Programme.” Without leadership, without the tribune of the people, “who is
able to react to every manifestation of tyranny and oppression,” the workers would settle for
economic concessions, never achieving the political power that was necessary to move History
into its next stage of development.44 This vanguard would unleash propaganda and agitation
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among all strata of the people, resulting in the political consciousness of the proletariat that was
the prerequisite for social transformation.45
On its own, ideology does not cause violence and terror. There has to be an intersection of
ideology and circumstance, like there was in Russia in 1905 when Marxist ideology and domestic
crisis collided.46 With revolution in Russia, the horrors of Bloody Sunday, the disaster of the war
with Japan, and demands across the country for social reforms, Lenin’s ideas on political violence
began to take shape. Lenin interpreted the crisis through a Marxist lens, with his commitment to
class struggle, his belief that History progresses dialectically through revolutionary violence, and
his acceptance of the legitimacy and justness of revolutionary violence. 47 Developed within the
Russian context, a Russianized Marxism evolved and, once filtered through Lenin’s unique
personality, became a militant ideology, uncompromising on the necessity of violence in creating
social and political change.48
Consideration of the dialectical process is important for understanding the political role of
violence during the Civil War period. Lenin believed, as did many Marxists of the time, that
revolutionary violence would negate reactionary violence.49 Violence, then, was both ethical and
moral, because its function and purpose was to overcome violence itself. As a Marxist, Lenin was
a theorist of the dialectical concept of peace through violence – a moral violent struggle against all
violence for the liberation of all peoples.50 The only way to overcome bourgeois violence, Lenin
came to believe, was through revolutionary civil war.51
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Lenin’s Marxism militarized class struggle, praising civil warfare and rejecting a more
compromising and gradual revolutionary path. Lenin believed, along with Marx and Marxist
theoretician Karl Kautsky, that revolutionary violence had a progressive function.52 Only an armed
insurrection could overcome the autocracy.53 Social transformation demanded violence. As Lenin
wrote in 1906, “We would be deceiving ourselves and the people if we concealed from the masses
the necessity of a desperate bloody war of extermination.”54 With Marxism filtered through the
Russian experience and Lenin’s personality, a more militant and militarized ideology emerged. 55
Leninism advocated political violence as both moral and necessary, the only means of affecting
social transformation. Revolutionary violence would end reactionary violence and overcome
bourgeois oppression, moving society forward into the next stage of historical development.56

Stalinism and the Enemies of History
Because Stalin’s worldview so closely resembled Marx, Engels, and Lenin, the Soviet
system throughout the 1930s, or Stalinism, was a continuation and culmination of MarxismLeninism. The worldview did not change, but new circumstances – including the rise of fascist
Italy, Nazi Germany, and Imperial Japan, along with capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union –
demanded new practices and policies. Stalinism was both an ideology and a political system,
encompassing the entirety of Soviet institutions, structures, and rituals. 57 Stalin fulfilled and
completed the work that Lenin began. It was Lenin, and not Stalin, who began the process of using
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the tools intended for total war for revolutionary politics and revolutionary transformation.58 It is
important to recognize and understand the legacy of brutality that led to Stalinism. The
unprecedented violence and chaos that engulfed Russia during the years of world war, civil war,
and revolution, had a lasting impact on the Soviet state. As historian Peter Holquist argues when
discussing the years 1914 to 1921, “many of the features we presume to be Stalinist in fact were
inscribed into the Soviet system at this time.”59
The only way to understand the fate of men like Stepan Prokhorovich Stashchenko, one of
the nearly 700,000 people executed by NKVD officers during the Great Terror, is to analyze and
scrutinize Soviet ideology.60 The process involves asking who were the victims of the Great Terror
and how were they portrayed and presented in the writings of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. The first
wave of victims consisted primarily of Party members and military officers, the Bolshevik “old
guard.” The next wave, the mass and national operations, included former kulaks, criminals, and
other “anti-Soviet elements,” along with non-Russian contingents across the Soviet Union. By
examining each group, it becomes evident just how essential ideology was in unleashing the mass
violence and repression of the Great Terror. It also demonstrates how ideology transcends the
theoretical and expresses itself in the practical, which is to say that Soviet ideology is empirically
perceptible in phenomena such as the Great Terror. With every arrest and every execution, we see
both the ideal and the policies employed to realize the ideal.
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“I demand that dogs gone mad should be shot”
The first wave of the Great Terror targeted the “old guard” of Bolshevik elites, military
officers, the NKVD leadership core, and industrial managers. The NKVD, under the new
leadership and new direction of Nikolai Ezhov, executed approximately 40,000 individuals from
the old guard between 1936 and 1938. The executions followed Stalin’s address to the graduates
of the Red Army Academies on 4 May 1935. Speaking of the current state of affairs in the Soviet
Union, Stalin railed, “We need people who have mastered technique” and “We lack people with
sufficient experience to squeeze out of this technique all that can be squeezed out of it.” For Stalin,
the situation was dire: “We now have a dearth of people, of cadres, of workers capable of
harnessing technique and advancing it.” He was speaking of all sectors of Soviet society – the
factories, mills, collective farms, state farms, army, and transport system. “We inherited from the
past a technically backward, impoverished and ruined country,” Stalin told the new graduates,
“with isolated industrial oases lost in a sea of dwarf peasant farms.” The task was “to transfer this
country from medieval darkness to modern industry and mechanized agriculture.” This address
was not intended simply to inspire the graduates with a sense of purpose for their futures. Stalin
believed war was coming and the Soviet Union was not prepared. If they did not act in the present,
they would “become a stake in the game of the imperialist powers.” But, Stalin concluded, “if we
have good and numerous cadres in industry, agriculture, transport, and the army – our country will
be invincible.”61 The ideal, then, was to produce educated cadres who would be loyal to the Party
and help Stalin continue his quest to create and defend socialism in Russia.
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Stalin believed that the Soviet Union did not have the properly trained and educated cadres
that were necessary to lead the country forward along its path to a radiant future. The new
graduates, new products of Stalin’s cultural revolution, would lead the way, helping Stalin to build
and defend socialism in the Soviet Union. Through war and revolution, the old guard had fulfilled
their purpose. But now they lacked the skills necessary to advance the Soviet state. Like so many
others, they had no place in the future utopia. In time, History itself would wash them away – but
one thing that Stalin did not have was time, with the certainty of war approaching, so he sped up
the process by initiating the first wave of purges. There were certainly other factors to consider,
all of which made Stalin’s decision that much easier. In his address, he spoke of the opponents
who wanted to retreat from industrialization and collectivization, comrades who opposed “the plan
of advance.” As many historians have noted, based on Trotsky’s notorious remark that “The Party
is always right,” there could be no voice of dissent.62 The logic was simple – those who opposed
the Party line were enemies of the Party, and those who were enemies of the Party were necessarily
enemies of History.
During his concluding speech at the end of the first Moscow show trial in July 1936, state
prosecutor Andrei Vyshinsky said, “before us are criminals, dangerous, hardened, cruel and
ruthless towards our people, towards our ideals, towards the leaders of our struggle, the leaders of
the toilers of the whole world… I demand that dogs gone mad should be shot – every one of
them!”63 The accused, loyal members of the old guard for decades, confessed to absurd plots to
murder Stalin and restore capitalism. Their real crime was of course Stalin’s conviction that they
could no longer be trusted and had nothing left to offer the Party and the Soviet Union. Their
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leadership positions throughout all sectors of society needed to be filled by new, technically
educated cadres. They needed to be filled by individuals loyal to Stalin’s ideological vision. When
Ezhov addressed the Central Committee in 1936, he said, “We shall pull up this TrotskyistZinovievist slime by the root and physically annihilate them.”64 In Soviet parlance, this meant
anyone who opposed Stalin’s path to the radiant future. Within the Party, the NKVD, and the
military, there were many who, like Trotsky, saw a different path for the Soviet Union. For Stalin,
this opposition was a criminal act. All critics became counterrevolutionaries.65

“Ruthless war on the kulaks!”
In “Comrade Workers,” composed in 1918, Lenin wrote about Bolshevik enemies both at
home and abroad. When dealing with internal enemies, his entire focus was on the kulaks. He
called them the “rabid foes of the Soviet government,” “the most brutal, callous and savage
exploiters,” “bloodsuckers,” and “vampires.” He referred to them as leeches who have “sucked the
blood of the working people” and who have “prepared to strangle and massacre hundreds of
thousands of workers.” According to Lenin, under the stress and strain of civil war, these
“avaricious, bloated and bestial kulaks” would align with the landowners and foreign capitalists,
seeking to restore power to the tsars, priests, and bourgeoisie. He declared that peace and
compromise were impossible, that the proletariat must ruthlessly destroy the “predatory kulak.”
“Ruthless war on the kulaks!” Lenin pronounced, “Death to them!”66
For Marx, wealthy peasants, or kulaks, like all peasants, would be one of the unfortunate
classes that simply vanished off the face of the earth. His future socialist society consisted of
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workers, not peasants, a class that belonged only to the earlier stages of historical development.
Stalin synthesizes the teachings of Marx and Lenin, believing those who had been dekulakized,
men like Stepan Prokhorovich Stashchenko, could never play a role in the future utopia he was
constructing in the Soviet Union. Once a kulak, he may have reasoned, always a kulak. Following
Lenin’s lead, Stalin believed these former kulaks would instantly turn traitor in the event of war.
They would become spies for the enemy, doing everything in their power to restore capitalism in
Russian and destroy the Party apparatus. The kulak nature was conservative and reactionary, not
revolutionary. Twenty years after Lenin’s “Comrade Workers,” Stalin too declared ruthless war
on the kulaks when he approved NKVD Order 00447, launching the mass operations.67
Hannah Arendt said that Marx turned Hegel on his head, replacing the Hegelian dialectics
of thesis and antithesis with the class categories of bourgeoisie and proletariat and the centrality
of human thought with human labor.68 Similarly, Lenin turned Marx on his head, applying
conceptions of bourgeois society in an early-20th century Russia that was only partially
industrialized, with over 90% of its population consisting of peasants. To correspond with the
Marxist doctrines, Lenin needed a bourgeois oppressor and a proletarian oppressed. He found such
distinctions by looking to Russia’s peasantry. The prosperous, wealthier peasants became the
bourgeoisie while the poor peasants became the exploited and enslaved workers. Those in the
middle represented the petty bourgeoisie. As Aaron B. Retish writes in Russia’s Peasants in
Revolution: Citizenship, Identity, and the Creation of the Soviet State, 1914-1922, “From Lenin’s
notions of capitalist development in the Russian countryside, Bolsheviks divided the village into
three overarching typologies – poor (bedniaki), middle (seredniaki), and rich (kulaki) peasants –
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and so imposed class identities on peasants that did not exist as such before.”69 The Bolsheviks
quickly accepted these artificial divisions without question. Stalin became the guardian of the poor
peasants, proclaiming, “the main forces of our revolution are the workers and the poor peasants.”70
From the beginning, for both Lenin and Stalin, the kulaks represented the bourgeois exploiters,
enemies of the state, a class that needed to be annihilated. Stalin’s collectivization initiated the
process; his Great Terror completed it.

“counterrevolutionary outrage”
When discussing the lumpenproletariat, Marx and Engels referred to them as the “bribed
tool of reactionary intrigue.”71 As a group, the lumpenproletariat, lacking political consciousness,
void of any understanding of loyalty and allegiance, could be paid off by the foreign capitalists.
They were a threat to Stalin and the Soviet Union if a second Great War should erupt. And even if
there was peace, because they could never become a part of the working class, the
lumpenproletariat needed to be eliminated from the body politic. This group was composed of
habitual criminals, prostitutes, beggars, wanderers, gypsies, and anyone else believed to be
incapable of positively contributing to society. In the years leading up to Stalin’s purges,
authorities began expelling these groups from urban centers such as Moscow and Leningrad. In
1935, the authorities in Leningrad arrested and expelled 18,000 women accused of prostitution.
Most were sent to labor camps.72 The habitual criminals, because of their “corrupting influence,”
were also arrested and sent to labor camps. This group was classified as “repeat offenders who are
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part of the professional criminal world.”73 Other anti-Soviet elements included priests and
members of the clergy.
In 1937, NKVD order 00447 specifically targeted criminals, focusing on bandits, armed
robbers, pocket thieves, and recidivist criminals.74 As early as 1933, Stalin had declared theft to
be a “counterrevolutionary outrage.”75 Even stealing a loaf of bread was deemed a
counterrevolutionary act against the state. NKVD officers quickly began arresting individuals in
major urban areas suspected of criminal activity. At the same time, the militsiia began to purge the
railways and train stations of criminal elements, apprehending criminals and homeless children,
specifically targeting those involved in theft, robbery, and hooliganism.76
One of the problems historians face when dealing with Soviet understandings of
criminality, especially when researching the 1930s, is finding historical evidence to support their
arguments. Because of Stalin’s proclivity for secrecy, much of the record became a state secret, as
decisions and official policies never made it past the leader and his inner circle.77 Some of the laws
from the early 1930s did become public record, such as the infamous Law of August 7, 1932, that
declared state and socialist property to be “holy and inviolable.” Draconian punishments awaited
those convicted of theft. Juvenile delinquency was criminalized in 1935, as was abortion in 1936.
Stalin played the central role in these initiatives.78 Clearly, a pattern was emerging. Stalin’s
hardline approach to criminality reached its peak in 1937 with order 00447. With the Great Terror,
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Stalin specifically targeted social marginals and former criminals, hoping to eliminate them from
the Soviet Union.79
The concern, however, for the historian of the Great Terror, is to acknowledge the
complexity regarding Party ideas on criminals in the 1930s. There is a body of literature, most
often associated with Gulag studies, that suggests a belief in criminal redemption and
rehabilitation. At all stages of Soviet history, we see authorities resorting to both “the carrot and
the stick.” We should not expect things to be different in the 1930s, even at a time of extreme
social and political stress. But as Steven Barnes demonstrates, the “threshold of redeemabilty” was
significantly higher during the Terror.80 For those sent to the Gulag as counterrevolutionaries, the
possibility of redemption essentially disappeared throughout this period. Certainly, more research
needs to be done.

“enemy nations”
An idea inherent to Bolshevik thought was the belief that “non-Russians were uneducated,
unenlightened, and culturally backwards.”81 Nationalities, or ethnicities, were neither essential nor
eternal; they were merely manifestations of the capitalist stage of historical development. 82 Ethnic
populations would eventually shed their national identities and merge with the new Soviet order.
Assimilation was certain.83 Following the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917, one of the most
important tasks was finding a way to affect this assimilation quickly and efficiently. Trotsky
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believed non-Russians were wild and ignorant, incapable of discerning the Russian language and
the teachings of socialism.84 Others believed this cultural backwardness could be overcome
through education, leading to successful integration into the larger polity. 85 They advocated for a
state-sponsored evolutionism – to usher the nationalities “through the Marxist timeline of historical
development.”86 Clans and tribes would become nationalities, nationalities would become socialist
nations, and socialist nations would become communists.87 The smaller would merge with the
larger, “eventually resulting in the consolidation of clans, tribes, and nationalities into Soviet
socialist nations.”88
But the Soviet Union rejected any model associated with imperial Russia or modern
capitalist nation-states.89 The Bolsheviks saw nations through a Marxist lens, in class terms. They
equated Russia with the bourgeoisie and the national minorities with the proletariat. They saw in
this equation the oppressed versus the oppressor, the exploited versus the exploiter. The
Bolsheviks, firmly standing on the “correct” side of History, represented the proletariat, the
exploited and oppressed. They advocated an evolutionary process of assimilation, where
eventually class consciousness would triumph over national consciousness. This process would
occur naturally over time as minorities, such as the Udmurt, for example, would move from a sense
of Udmurt national identity, to consciousness of oppression, to a final stage of proletariat identity.90

84

Sanborn, 87. It is interesting to note that Trotsky speaks of all non-Russians as a single entity and does not
qualify with the pronoun “some.” His exact quote: the “wildness of non-Russians, ignorance of the Russian
language, infectious diseases, habituation to their climate, and inertness to the teaching of socialism.”
85
Retish, 237 and 228.
86
Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 2005), 8.
87
Ibid.
88
Hirsch, 274.
89
Terry Martin, “Borders and Ethnic Conflict: The Soviet Experiment in Ethno-Territorial Proliferation,” Jahrbücher
für Geschichte Osteuropas (1999), 538.
90
Aaron Retish, Lecture, “Appealing to the Masses: Nationality and Gender,” Wayne State University, April 2017.

37

The Bolsheviks initiated programs that were designed to support this three-step process.
They provided social and cultural resources through programs known as korenizatsiia. Rather than
using violence and repression to force assimilation, the Bolsheviks encouraged the development
of national identity. They gave national minorities their own territories. They would use the local
languages and dialects to disseminate socialist ideology, printing the Communist Manifesto in
countless tongues. The goal was to move the national minorities not towards Russian culture, but
towards Soviet culture.91 Stalin, as Commissar of Nationalities, believed that the granting of
national territories would result in the crumbling of national identity and the awakening of class
identity.92 But the theoretical ideal of an evolutionary process towards assimilation proved to be
extremely difficult to implement on the ground level.
The dream of national evolution was seriously challenged during the Civil War. Like the
revolution, this was a Great Russian affair, as many of the border nationalities never leant their
support to the Bolsheviks. In Finland and the Baltic states, the “Whites” had full control. The
lesson was not lost on Stalin – some nationalities, with their autonomous sentiment, could not be
trusted. During the Civil War, many sided with the bourgeois governments.93 Certainly they would
do the same thing again if given the opportunity. By the mid-1930s, Stalin was convinced that the
nationalities were essentially “enemy nations” connected to foreign states.94 National evolution
had failed. The ethnicities were incapable of assimilation. The national operations were designed
to eliminate the ethnic populations who were most likely to ally themselves with the enemy. Stalin
wished to destroy these contingents, a potential “fifth column,” before it had the chance to form.
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The Ethics of Terror
Martin Malia has called the Soviet worldview “a totalizing ideology buttressed by terror.”95
Violence was an essential tool for social transformation.96 Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders were
inspired by the French Revolution and the Paris Commune. In “Lesson of the Commune” Lenin
wrote, “there are times when the interests of the proletariat call for ruthless extermination of its
enemies.”97 The reason the Commune failed was because the revolutionaries had failed to destroy
their enemies. This was the lesson that Lenin would remember the rest of his life; a lesson that he
would pass on to his Bolshevik comrades. Its practical application is seen in the Red Terror of
1918, and certainly in Stalin’s blood purges of the 1930s. When it came to warfare, Lenin believed
in its absolute necessity to affect real and lasting change, writing “We fully regard civil wars, i.e.,
wars waged by the oppressed class against the oppressing class, slaves against slave-holders, serfs
against land-owners, and wage-workers against the bourgeoisie, as legitimate, progressive and
necessary.”98 To give birth to the future, enemies of the present would have to be destroyed. This
was not only necessary, it was a moral imperative because enemies of the Party were enemies of
History, and the Bolsheviks were the manifestation of History’s will on earth. As the Chekists said,
“history would forgive an excess of harshness but not of weakness.”99
The idea of violence as an appropriate and necessary tool was an integral part of Soviet
ideology. Disputes with Stalin over the correct path for the Soviet Union centered on various
programs and processes, but even the opposition accepted and encouraged the use of violence as
a means to achieving political ends. Trotsky wrote, “Arguments to the effect that all violence,
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including revolutionary violence, is evil and that communists therefore ought not engage in the
‘glorification’ of armed struggle and the revolutionary army, amount to a philosophy worthy of
Quakers and the old maids of the Salvation Army.”100 Violence was compulsory to cleanse the
Soviet Union of enemies, obligatory to purify the state and wash away the adversaries of socialism.
Leninism and Stalinism were both teleological ethical systems. When Western scholars
apply their deontological understandings of morality to events such as the Red Terror and the Great
Terror, the result is an explicit and unequivocal condemnation, usually in the form of a personal
attack on either Lenin or Stalin. But just as the historian must keep in mind historical circumstances
when analyzing the past, so too must he or she be mindful of different ethical systems. In the
teleological system, actions have no intrinsic value or worth. The standard of right and wrong,
good and evil, is the comparative consequences of the available actions. An action is good if it
produces the best consequences. Moral judgements follow from the consequences of actions. What
matters is the end result, not the means employed to realize that end. Nothing is more important
than the goal, the telos. The criterion of morality lies in an abstract, nonmoral value that results
from action, such as equality, justice, or welfare.101 This reasoning allowed both Lenin and Stalin
to justify the use of mass violence and repression.
Stalin’s goal, the building and defending of socialism in Russia, a society defined by justice
and equality, was the quintessential standard. The actions he took, through his leadership core and
NKVD officers, may have been morally repulsive in a deontological ethical system, but in the
Soviet Union in the 1930s, where society was grounded in a teleological system, these actions
were largely regarded as morally necessary to defend the revolution and save the Soviet Union
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from internal and external enemies. Specific ethical systems, along with understandings of
epistemology and political philosophy, are all aspects of modern ideologies. This is something
many historians must not forget when asking the most important historical question: Why?
Hannah Arendt understood the primacy of ideology in the Soviet experiment, the “idea” of
class struggle resolving in a socialist utopia as Stalin’s raison d’être. The purpose was the end
goal, the telos. According to the ideological principles that informed Stalin’s actions as leader of
the Soviet Union, the present is merely a stage of some further development. History is governed
by a law of movement, a linear movement that culminates with the establishment of a socialist
civilization. Terror is a tool making it possible for the force of History to move freely through
mankind, unconstrained by spontaneous human action. If law is the law of movement of the
suprahuman force of History, then the use of terror is lawful.102
Stalin’s actions were aimed at the acceleration of the movement of History. He sacrificed
the “parts” for the sake of the “whole”; eliminated individuals for the sake of the species. History
was destined to move from capitalism to socialism – Stalin’s purges were designed to speed up
this process by eliminating individuals and groups that could potentially slow down and hinder
historical progression and social transformation.
Terror, as a tool, is only a servant of historical development. History has already
pronounced the death sentence on the “dying classes,” state terror simply executes that sentence
in a swifter and more efficient manner. Opposition to this process is not permitted. Elimination of
the enemies of History is obligatory and compulsory. Anyone who stands in the way of the
historical process is guilty. For Stalin, this meant anyone who opposed the Party, anyone who
could potentially fight to restore capitalism in the Soviet Union, and anyone deemed incapable of
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contributing to a socialist society. The reasoning was explicit and precise: The Party represents
the logic of History; Stalin represents the Party; if you oppose Stalin, then you oppose the Party;
if you oppose the Party, then you oppose the logic of History; and if you oppose the logic of
History, then you are a counterrevolutionary enemy of History. In this system, a lack of fealty
necessitated imprisonment or execution – the accused were not simply opposing Stalin’s will, they
were opposing the logic of History.103
In the Soviet system, not only did the end justify the means, the end was often achieved
through violence.104 Lenin had no scruples about using violence to achieve the end goal of
socialism. Violence was, in fact, intrinsic to Lenin’s philosophy of revolution.105 The same can be
said for Stalin. Stalin shared Lenin’s system of teleological ethics, a system both men derived from
Marx. What mattered was not the individual, but society, and “to steer this society in the necessary
direction is the ultimate act of true morality for a Marxist.” In Marxist theory, human beings are
nothing more than instruments of the historical process.106 With the Great Terror, Stalin was
attempting to move the Soviet Union in the necessary direction.
Francine Hirsch writes, “The Bolsheviks took from Karl Marx the ideas that there was a
“logic” (or “telos”) to history, and that it was possible to get on the “right side” of the historical
process by carefully interpreting its inner dynamics and figuring out where one stood on the
timeline of development.”107 Stalin’s blood purges were an attempt to put the Soviet Union on the
“right side” of the historical process, to move his nation in the “correct” direction by eliminating
those who could potentially undermine the revolution and return Russian to a state of Asiatic
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backwardness. The socialist project, what was hailed the “culmination of history, the telos of
human development,”108 entailed radical defensive measures to ensure that counterrevolutionary
forces could not disrupt the process and initiate a regression in the Soviet Union. It was necessary
to move forward, in the correct direction, following the logic of history.
In the Soviet Union in the 1930s, there was one end, one supreme goal: the building and
defense of socialism. As Malia argues, “everything that did not contribute to achieving this goal
was ipso facto a hostile element to be purged from the system.”109 In a teleological ethical system,
this is the moral thing to do – whatever is necessary to achieve the goal. Perhaps several hundred
thousand individuals would have to die, but Soviet society and Soviet civilization would flourish.
This was the logic of History, the very heart of Bolshevik ideology, expressed under Lenin in the
Red Terror and under Stalin in the Great Terror.
Ideology was the guiding light and driving force behind Stalin’s terror. His concern was
with the process of becoming, the unfolding of historical development. The Great Terror sought to
cleanse the Soviet Union of those with the potential capacity to disrupt this process. It employed
mass terror and repression with the goal of eliminating the enemies of History.110

Conclusion
In the tragedy of Elektra, Sophocles wrote, “The end excuses any evil.” For Stalin, inspired
by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, the end was socialism in Russia. The achievement of this goal
required “the most radical rupture with traditional ideas.”111 Bourgeois conceptions of morality
would only hinder the drive for revolutionary transformation. At a time of geopolitical uncertainty
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and domestic strain, there was a synthesis of idea and action, as Stalin and his inner circle sought
to safeguard the Soviet Union and defend the revolution by eliminating both present and potential
threats.112 Ideology drove the Great Terror. The Party’s ideal of creating a socialist civilization in
Russia faced dire threats by the 1930s, both internally and externally. Stalin and his core leadership
group initiated programs and policies meant to ensure that the will of History would not be
hindered by reactionary forces. These forces were on the ascendant throughout the interwar period,
in fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and across Eastern Europe. It was an epic struggle
between the antithetical ideologies of fascism and communism – a struggle for the fate of humanity
and the future of civilization. Geopolitical circumstances, both foreign and domestic, threatened
to destroy the Soviet state. Stalin and his leadership group proactively responded to the threats,
initiating programs designed to safeguard the revolution. And this was the essence of Soviet
ideology – not only the goal of building socialism in Russia and the vision of creating a communist
empire of justice, but the specific practices and polices employed to realize the goal and manifest
the vision.
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CHAPTER 3 “AFTER THE FLOOD: THE INTERWAR CRISIS AND THE
RISE OF STALIN”

The element of truth behind all of this, which people are so ready to disavow, is that men are not
gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are
attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be
reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbour is for them not only a
potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness
on him, to exploit his capacity for work without compensation, to use him sexually without his
consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and kill him.
Sigmund Freud 1

The Deluge
Ten million soldiers died in the First World War. Twenty million more returned home
wounded or disabled. Millions of young women and children were left widowed or orphaned, cities
and villages lied in ruins, and disease and starvation ravaged the lands.2 Social, political, and
cultural destruction quickly followed, as the war annihilated the very foundations of knowledge
and understanding that had supported life in Europe for millennia, resulting in mass trauma,
anxiety, and an epistemological crisis that came to define the interwar period. For those who
survived the devastation, the world they knew, along with the ways in which they understood that
world, had been swept away by the conflict’s hideous waves of violence and savagery. Many of
the great empires had fallen, including the Russian, German, Ottoman, and Austria-Hungary
empires that had exercised power and authority throughout the world for centuries. 3 With the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1922, an Islamic state based on a caliphate, shari’ah, and the

1

Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 1930, in The Freud Reader edited by Peter Gay (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1995), 749.
2
Martin Kitchen, Europe Between the Wars (New York: Routledge, 2013), 55-61.
3
The Russian Empire under the Romanov dynasty lasted from 1721 to 1917.

45

ulama had vanished, leaving countless Muslims throughout the Middle East in a desperate state of
bewilderment and confusion.4
In the wake of the Great War, sixty million people died from famine and disease, as
tuberculosis and cholera slayed both city and country dwellers. Over fifty million more died
worldwide from the Spanish Flu.5 The destruction was absolute. The political structures that had
organized and defined European civilization collapsed. The war even weakened and debilitated
the great French and British empires. It was a time of unbearable and unimaginable loss. It was
also a time of economic crisis, as the Great Depression plunged millions worldwide into poverty
throughout the 1930s. Many intellectuals of the period saw these years as the degeneration and
disintegration of civilization, and there was an understanding, for both those on the political Left
and those on the Right, that only strength and force could resolve the crisis.6
The war was nothing less than cataclysmic, a horrifying deluge of death and destruction
that swept away tens of millions of lives and the very foundations of European civilization. In
response to the extraordinary devastation, modern states around the world envisioned utopian
futures, new world orders defined by either rationality and progress or power and virility. Creating
a radiant future from the still smoldering rubble entailed much more than rebuilding towns and
villages or restructuring economies; it meant proclaiming a new way of living, a new system of
organizing society, and a new method of expressing cultural values. In this environment emerged
competing and conflicting worldviews, as proponents of fascism, socialism, and democracy fought
to the death trying to convince the world that their vision for the future of civilization was the one
and only true path to follow. For this reason, scholars often refer to the interwar period as the “age
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of ideology.” If the term today has become somewhat abstract and nebulous, in the interwar period
ideology was the driving force of history.
The interwar period was a time of profound anxiety. There was a tremendous tension
between the forces of modernity and tradition. Industrialization and urbanization left people
uncertain of their place in the world. Science and progress led to war and destruction. The
Existentialists questioned humanity’s faith in reason, rationality, and progress. The influential
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche had seen a crisis born of modernity, and only two decades after
his death that crisis began to manifest in dark and disturbing ways. Many saw in modernity
evidence of the decline of European civilization. Gandhi proclaimed modern civilization to be a
disease with the potential to infect and destroy the entire world, arguing that Western civilization
was void of both spirituality and morality and that man was a slave to bodily comforts and material
goods.7 In even darker and more dismal terms, Sigmund Freud argued that man’s primitive,
reptilian impulses still endured after countless years of evolution. He believed that two
fundamental forces remained from man’s ancestral past, influencing our actions and driving our
behavior: sexuality and aggression. Contrary to Enlightenment ideals based on reason and
rationality, Freud believed man’s nature was inclined towards violence and destruction. Man’s
aggressive instinct, Freud proclaimed, his “instinct of death” that manifests in ferocity and
brutality, is antithetical to civilization.8
With exhilarating visions of utopian futures, the “saviors of civilization” emerged. In Italy,
Benito Mussolini enthralled the masses. In Germany, Adolf Hitler raged against the “parasites”
who threatened to devour European culture. And in the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin embarked on
the creation of the world’s first socialist society, initiating mass industrialization, collectivization,
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and cultural revolution. It was a global phenomenon, as state leaders, scientists, artists, and
scholars all sought to reveal their own unique vision of the next stage of History and proclaim the
specific programs and practices that would ensure the realization of these visions.9
I argue that a series of potentially devastating foreign and domestic circumstances
intersected with a militant ideology, resulting in the Great Terror. Domestically, living standards
in the Soviet Union rapidly deteriorated in the interwar period, opposition to Stalinism steadily
increased after the disastrous results of collectivization and the stress and strain of rapid
industrialization, and the possible emergence of a “fifth column” all influenced and impacted
Stalin’s decision to initiate the blood purges. Internationally, the rise of fascism, with its
categorical insistence on radical expansionism and its explicit condemnation of socialism, posed
an existential threat to the Soviet experiment. Additionally, tension in the Far East, the Spanish
Civil War, and capitalist encirclement all posed extreme dangers for the future of the Soviet state.
And finally, the near cataclysmic destruction of the first world war compelled Stalin, like other
global leaders, including Mussolini and Hitler, to take decisive action in ensuring the safety and
security of his people and the future welfare of his state. This was a battle for humanity, a
momentous clash between progressive and reactionary forces that would determine the fate of
human civilization. A second great war seemed inevitable.
By exploring Italy under Mussolini and Germany under Hitler, along with other examples
of ideologies and practices antithetical to Soviet interests, the significance of the threat to the
Soviet Union becomes evident. The interwar period saw the rise of the fanatical obsession of the
leadership cult.10 No two men exemplified this cult more than Mussolini and Hitler. Expounding
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ideologies that rejected all forms of socialism and liberalism, Italian fascism and Nazism
denounced egalitarianism, praising instead the inequality of men and nations. Both ideologies were
fundamentally nationalistic, imperialistic, and fixated on creating new utopian empires based on
glorious and mythical pasts. The Soviet system of political governance, the predominance of Slavic
ethnicities, and the rich and fertile lands of the western Soviet Union all made Stalin’s communist
state a target of fascist aggression.

Italy11
In Italy, fearful that the future of Western civilization hung in the balance, the fascists
advocated an ideology bent on overcoming cultural decadence and spiritual degradation.12 Western
civilization, Mussolini and his followers argued, had become corrupt and decadent following the
Great War. Intervention was needed to cure the deviant impulses that plagued society and
immersed it in depravity and dissolution.13 The ideal was ancient Rome, a glorious past when men
were courageous, vigorous, and virile. Fascist ideology portrayed Mussolini as an artist, shaping
and molding the population at will.14
In their first demonstration of brutality, the Italian fascists dealt with a popular uprising in
Libya by targeting both combatants and civilians. Along with traditional methods of warfare,
Mussolini’s forces employed systematic terror. By 1932, Italian forces slaughtered an estimated
100,000 civilians. In 1935, after invading Ethiopia, the Italians bombed Red Cross hospitals and
used chemical weapons on civilian populations, killing 250,000 Ethiopians. Hundreds of
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thousands more suffered from severe illness following the chemical attacks. The assault on
civilians continued during the Spanish Civil War, when Mussolini sent his troops to support
Spanish dictator Francisco Franco. Italian bombers targeted Barcelona specifically because of its
civilian population, killings scores of innocent men, women, and children in the process.15
Fascist ideology focused on action, the very antithesis of Enlightenment virtues such as
reason and rationality. Italian fascists believed in “familial, religious, authoritarian, and legal
values,” “values that have been attacked and destroyed by the encyclopedic cultural ideas of the
Enlightenment.”16 Fascism essentially conceived of life in black and white terms, with no gray
zones and no places for compromise. It was either a resounding yes or a resounding no: The fascists
said yes to war, struggle, aggression, inequality, imperialism, nationalism, action, and virility; they
said no to peace, comfort, pacifism, contemplation, egalitarianism, liberalism, and socialism.
At the core of the Italian fascist belief system was an emphasis on reality as opposed to
fantasy. Although socialism claimed to be scientific, the fascists argued, it was nothing more than
a delusion. The entire foundation of socialist ideology was constructed from an economic theory
that completely ignored the primacy and power of human nature. This nature, as influential
thinkers such as Freud and Nietzsche contended, was violent and irrational. The fascist ideologues
abandoned any and all scientific constructions, focusing instead on action and emotion. As a result,
a clear and distinct fascist ideology never fully developed. What did emerge was often lacking in
logical validity and riddled with contradictions. But that was really the whole point – they were
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concerned with action, not theory. They wanted to create a new Italian empire, not construct a new
philosophical system.
Although fascist ideology in Italy was firmly grounded in reality, at least according to its
proponents, it still gave expression to an ideal that would help the Italian fascists achieve their
ultimate goal of transcending reality, which is to say transforming Italy from its current state of
relative mediocrity into a great world empire modeled on ancient Rome. Giovanni Gentile, the
premier philosopher of the Italian fascist regime and minister of public instruction, wrote in 1936,
“Our present ideal is to create a culture that produces men aware of this great tragedy of life: life
as the struggle to make one’s way not selfishly or for oneself but for everyone. For everyone,
because the life of Italy also informs the life of Europe and the rest of the world.”17 Gentile was
speaking specifically of the fascist culture that would ultimately triumph over the decadence that
threatened to engulf civilization.
The Italian fascists praised traditional, conservative values. Fascism promised restoration,
not only of public order but also “those traditional social units that are sacred and inviolable…
first and foremost among them, religion and the family.”18 The interwar culture that thrived in
cities such as Paris and Berlin presaged the death and destruction of family values and traditional
gender roles. Julius Evola argued that Western civilization “had carried out the most complete
perversion of the rational order of things.”19 Modernity, for the Italian fascists, became
synonymous with decadence – an inescapable decline and degradation of Western civilization.
Fascism presented itself as the heroic savior of civilization. The fascist regime in Italy
espoused a reactionary ideology aimed at remolding behaviors to combat cultural decadence and
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spiritual degeneration. The fascist state, in order to save both Italy and the world from impending
catastrophe, would intervene to cure “deviant and decadent impulses.”20 Words such as aggression,
virility, bravery, discipline, will, and power appear over and over again. These are the
characteristics and attributes of the ideal fascist man and, by extension, the fascist state. These
qualities had to be nurtured and developed, praised and honored as the epitome of greatness. The
repetition of the language is astonishing, as is the use of antithetical sentiments such as peace and
ease, representing the decadent forces of modernity. A certain pragmatism resulted in this hypermasculine use of language. If fascism “conceives of life as a struggle,” 21 then strength and power
were necessary to overcome hardships and emerge victoriously. For Mussolini, there was no place
in fascist thought and action for compassion or empathy. In a speech in Rome in 1942, Il Duce
proclaimed, “War cannot be waged without hating the enemy from morning to night, in all the
hours of the day and night, without spreading hatred and without making it an intrinsic part of
one’s self. We must rid ourselves once and for all of false sentimentality.”22
In “Foundations and Doctrine of Fascism,” Mussolini wrote, “Life for the fascist is a
continuous, ceaseless battle that we eagerly embrace with great courage and with the requisite
sense of intrepidness.”23 Life and war were inseparable, and potent warriors were imperative if the
Italian fascists wished to obliterate their adversaries and establish their empire. As they surveyed
the scene in Italy and across Europe, they saw the instability of a rapidly changing society and the
outright rejection of traditional principles, a pervasive decadence that undermined conservative
values. And in looking at the political climate, they were horrified to see a movement to the Left
that had the potential to transform the world order and establish what they considered to be a
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profoundly “unnatural” rule of impotent idealists. Mario Puccini, a renowned novelist and critic,
wrote in 1926, “Other peoples have, at least for the most part, lost that sense of virile stability and
that contact with reality from which, and solely from which, a lasting and deep art may be born.”24
Born of war and revolution, like a deadly tsunami, a menacing red wave descended on
Europe, crashing down on Hungary, Poland, Germany, and Italy. The fascist party was created to
rid Italy of an ineffective Liberal democracy and the spreading socialist contagion that was
becoming increasingly stronger and more virulent. The fascists would not be as indifferent as the
Italian state that stood by and watched events unfold, refusing to act as the fascists and socialists
engaged in bloody conflict, and neither would the throngs of Italian citizens who supported the
fascist cause. The middle-class feared losing their property and privileges. Land owners feared
giving up their land. The Catholic Church feared the abolishment of religion. Big business feared
an end to an economic system that allowed them to flourish. And military leadership, along with
a majority of World War I veterans, feared the downfall and collapse of Italy. As historian Martin
Kitchen states, “The respectable classes therefore looked for protection against the red peril.”25
The fascists thrived in this atmosphere of fear and panic.
The fascist “Black Shirts” attacked socialists on city streets and in country villages. They
became progressively more ferocious, intensifying their brutality, destroying trade union offices,
harassing, beating, and murdering anyone who supported the socialist agenda. What resulted was
essentially civil war, as fascists and socialists clashed throughout Italy. People around the world,
fearful of the red menace, celebrated the fascists for their courage and bravery. The Times
newspaper in London wrote, “Fascismo has proved itself virile, well-disciplined, fearless, and
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ready for emergencies.”26 The socialists, although passionate and determined, ultimately lacked
the leadership to bring the revolution to Italy. Without a Lenin to guide them, they were crushed
by the fascist onslaught.
In the dangerous and unstable world of interwar Europe, the Italian fascists resolved to
manifest “strong, hard, active, solar, Mediterranean beings; beings made up of force and
eventually only of force.”27 Mussolini promised Italy both a renewal of ancient Roman power and
a glorious Italian future. Giovanni Gentile wrote, “Sooner or later all peoples who aren’t resigned
to perishing must wage war.”28 The Italians did not wish to perish. As a nation, the fascists argued,
they had to make a choice between impotence and power, between weakness and virility. What
was needed was “a will to action, a will to greatness, and a will to power on the part of the Italian
nation and civilization.”29 Mussolini became the physical manifestation of this will, the heroic
conqueror and lion tamer who would lead Italy to its glorious future.
Fascism in Italy arose out of this conflict between modernity and tradition. Only strength
and power could destroy the forces that threatened to consume civilization. Only a courageous
man of action could overcome the perils of decadence and decay and drive History forward.
Fascism was a product of its time, arising “in a period of tumultuous fervor and of political
passion.”30 It was a dangerous time, as a new-style politics emerged based on mass participation
and systematic political violence. Although the Italian fascists ultimately failed, their ideology was
born of necessity as a practical solution to the chaos, trauma, and anxiety that plagued interwar
Europe.
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Mussolini’s goal was to recreate modern Italy in the image of ancient Rome. The ideology
he and his followers professed was profoundly aggressive and militaristic. To create the ideal, to
realize their glorious future, all enemies were to be destroyed without mercy or pity. In the
aftermath of the Great War, there was a desperate need to create a new type of future. Mussolini
offered his vision of what that type of future should be, and the Italian fascists employed practices
that they believed would destroy the “red menace” of communism and bring the vision to fruition.

Germany31
Nazi ideology was fundamentally driven by racism and expansionism. This was the
foundation, and from this foundation emerged the political and nationalistic worldview that
resulted in World War II. The goal of Nazism was the creation of a racial utopia, a purified Volk
ruled and controlled by the Aryan elites.32 In order to achieve this utopia, the Nazis needed to
expand their territory eastward beyond the borders of Germany and eliminate or enslave the
inferior races that dwelled there. In its essence, Nazi ideology was based on this twofold goal of
racial purity and Lebensraum (Hitler’s concept of living space in Eastern Europe for the Germans).
The Nazi regime wanted to acquire the rich and fertile lands of Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union,33 a large geographical region that included Poland, the Baltic States, Soviet Belarus,
Soviet Ukraine, and portions of western Soviet Russia.34 The acquisition of this living space was
essential for the Nazis, and they were willing to wage war and murder millions of people in order
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acquire it and manifest their ideal of Lebensraum. This desire in part followed from the German
defeat in World War I and the humiliating terms of the Treaty of Versailles in which Germany lost
large amounts of land to France and Poland. Lebensraum in many ways represented the desire to
regain their losses and overcome their humiliation. But it is important to remember that it was not
only about making up for past losses – Hitler had a vision for a glorious German future, and this
utopia could only be realized through expansionism.
Germany wanted “to conquer, exploit and colonize the European part of the Soviet
Union.”35 Polish historian Czeslaw Pilichowski has argued that the Nazis wanted to “gradually
denationalize and destroy the Slavic peoples, who were described as ‘inferior’ and ‘subhumans’
in Nazi racial ideology.”36 Here we see the connection between the Nazi desire for geographical
expansion and Nazi racial beliefs. The two cannot be separated. They work together to create a
unified Nazi ideology. This becomes evident when comparing the relatively peaceful occupations
in Western Europe with the violent occupations in the East. The difference was that in the East
there were both millions of Jews and Slavs and an abundance of fertile agricultural lands. The
Nazis wanted these lands and they wanted to either destroy or enslave the peoples living there.
Eastern Europe is where Nazi conceptions of racial hygiene and Lebensraum converged with
devastating consequences.
The Nazis appropriated conceptions of racial purity to serve and justify their vision of an
Aryan utopia. According to proponents of eugenics, “the well-being and vitality of a nation
depended on the genetic fitness of its members.”37 Taken to its most illogical conclusions, eugenics
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argued that the Aryan race held supremacy over inferior races such as the Jews and the Slavs. For
Nazi supporters, Darwin’s theory of evolution and natural selection was applied to mankind.
Human beings were not equal, and any notion of egalitarian ethics was absurd. The weak sought
to overcome the strong, to reproduce with the powerful and superior in an effort to ensure the
survival of their offspring. In time, Nazi supporters and sympathizers argued, the blood of the
Aryans would be mixed with the blood of non-Aryans, ending Aryan supremacy and creating a
degenerate race of inferiors. The Aryans had to destroy the inferior races if they were to survive,
if culture and civilization was to survive. Jews, Slavs, and Gypsies had to be eliminated because
of their “alien blood.”
Historian Marion A. Kaplan has written that Nazi “biological politics promised a racial
cleansing and reorganization of Germany and Europe that would be implemented through largescale eugenic schemes.”38 The lands of the East that the Nazis wished to conquer contained
Europe’s largest population of Jews and Slavs.39 These inferior beings would have to be destroyed
if the Nazis were to fulfill their destiny. For the Nazi regime, eugenics allowed them to clearly
formulate their ultimate purpose: “Creating a unified racial community in which alien and inferior
elements were eliminated and individuals renounced other ties and loyalties and were prepared to
sacrifice themselves for the community would produce an irresistible instrument of expansion and
conquest.”40
Hitler’s Mein Kampf, despite its rambling and often incoherent prose, provides crucial
insight into a belief system that served as a starting point for Nazi ideology. Hitler identifies
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socialism as a menace that had the potential to destroy humanity, arguing that the Jewish doctrine
of Marxism rejected the aristocratic principles of Nature and the eternal privilege of power and
strength. The socialist menace was an abomination of God’s will, and Hitler believed it was his
destiny to save humanity and civilization from this destructive force.41
Hitler’s thoughts on Marxism are clearly expressed in passages where he argues that
socialism was a pernicious threat to civilization, a perilous “world plague.”42 Marxism, according
to Hitler, “fans the need for social justice, somehow slumbering in every Aryan man, into hatred
against those who have been better favored by fortune.”43 Contrary to Nazi conceptions of
individual power and nobility, Marxism sought “to exclude the pre-eminence of personality in all
fields of human life and replace it by the numbers of the mass.” 44 The two ideological systems,
Marxism and Nazism, were completely incompatible and irreconcilable. Socialism, in the hands
of the Bolsheviks, was the “international serpent.”45 It was the task of the Nazis to crush this
serpent and save not only Germany, but all of humanity.
Throughout Mein Kampf, Hitler is unequivocal on his understanding of the Soviet Union,
calling the rulers of present-day Russia “common blood-stained criminals” and “the scum of
humanity,” who “slaughtered and wiped out thousands of her leading intellectuals in wild blood
lust, and now for almost ten years have been carrying on the most cruel and tyrannical régime of
all time.”46 Hitler truly believed it was his mission to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving its
ultimate mission: “to impose its bloody oppression on the whole world.”47 And if there was any
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doubt regarding Hitler’s intentions, he was clear and distinct on the nature of Nazi imperialism:
“We stop the endless German movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze toward the land
of the east… If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia and
her vassal border states.”48
What began as a policy of exclusion turned into a policy of annihilation – repression led to
genocide.49 The Nazis believed the supreme Aryan race had to defend itself from the non-Aryan
threat. This was a race war based on the tenets of eugenics and social Darwinism. The powerful
Aryan race was destined to destroy the inferior non-Aryans. Once this was accomplished, an Aryan
utopia could be created. To ensure the continued existence of this glorious utopia, the sick, the
weak, and the asocial had to be eliminated as well. It became absolutely necessary to prevent them
from passing on their “defective” genes.
In the Aryan utopia, a world of strength, honor, and purity, decadence and decay would
cease to exist. Culture would flourish and civilization would thrive. This was the ideal, and Hitler
and his followers believed it was not only possible but absolutely necessary. If they failed, the
inferior races would overcome the Aryans and civilization would be destroyed.
Some scholars have pointed out that the Nazis seemed to waver in their dealings with the
Slavic populations of Eastern Europe, that they were willing to work with Slavs and that they only
turned to policies of murder when the Slavic populations showed signs of active resistance. 50 But
these instances of apparent concessions are only further examples of the Nazi regime’s willingness
to do whatever was necessary to achieve their goals. They would do what they had to do in the
moment, never losing sight of their ideal. These Slavs had no future in the Aryan utopia. They
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would be murdered or enslaved, but never treated as equals. The Aryans and the Slavs could never
coexist. As Hitler argued in Mein Kampf, the Slavs were an “inferior race.”51 Nazi ideology
demanded progression; they would never allow for the possibility of regression.

A Global Phenomenon
In response to the red wave of socialism that descended on Europe following World War
I, virulent black waves of fascism arose in Italy, Germany, Spain, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia,
Austria, and even Japan. Supported by the industrialists, land owners, and middle-classes, fascism
in its various guises quickly grew momentum and popular support. From Western Europe to
Eastern Europe, and into the Far East, the fascist ideology vehemently opposed the Soviet project
and precluded, at least for the time being, the possibility of a global socialist revolution.
Historians have traditionally disregarded the political violence of interwar France, treating
it as a marginal phenomenon, but as new evidence continues to emerge, contemporary scholars are
now beginning to believe that such violence was an essential feature of all European states in the
interwar period, including France.52 By the mid-1920s, fascist-minded individuals founded several
extreme right-wing paramilitary groups, known as “leagues.” In the 1930s, several hundred
thousand men and women joined these groups. In response, the Left founded the anti-fascist
Popular Front. Brawls were a common occurrence, as people on both sides of the political spectrum
attacked one another with stones, bricks, cobbles, clubs, iron bars, and even stink bombs. The
police in turn used violence to maintain public order. During a protest in Paris in 1934, the police
killed thirteen rioters and injured hundreds more.53
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Romania envisioned their great future by looking to their mythical past. This idealized
Romania, the Volksgemeinschaft, was based on a belief in the sanctity of the nation and the
glorification of the Dacian Empire.54 The Romanian national mission of rejuvenation followed
from a faith in eugenics, racial anthropology, and serology. For the Romanian intelligentsia, who
viewed the nation as a living organism, improving the racial qualities of the nation soon became
“a totalizing nationalist ideology.”55
In 1926, the social hygienist and eugenicist Iuliu Moldovan published Biopolitica. He was
the first of many in Romania to link biopolitics with national politics. The ideas expressed by
Moldovan and others like him around the world were officially endorsed by political regimes
throughout Europe in the interwar period.56 The adoption of principles such as ethnic reengineering
and social segregation intimately linked with notions of a national rebirth leading to an ideal future.
A Romanian biopolitical utopia, free of Jews, gypsies, and the dysgenic, was based on the
“palingenetic myth” of rebirth. The Romanians sought a spiritual metamorphosis and a new
“ethnic ontology.”57
In Japan, liberal intellectuals railed against the proliferation of violence during the interwar
years. They argued that violence was an eroding force with the power to destroy civilization.
Violence represented the backward and uncivilized, the primitive and unevolved. It was disorder,
the antithesis of reason. They implored the state, as representatives of order, to intervene and stop
the violence.58
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Despite the pleas from forward -looking liberals, radical groups emerged that were linked
together by their reactionary ideology. They proclaimed reverence for the emperor and supported
aggressive imperialism. On city streets, they attacked socialists and anarchists. They also attacked
striking laborers. As a way to eliminate their enemies, assassinations were not uncommon. Fearful
of the Bolsheviks’ rise to power following the Russian Revolution, and what that could potentially
mean for Japan, they devoted themselves to protecting traditional Japanese values and ways of life
by embracing “the way of the warrior.”59 Violence was encouraged, and it was justified as a means
of protecting their homeland and demonstrating loyalty to the imperial house. The world around
them was changing rapidly. They too wanted to create a utopian future, in the image of their
magnificent past, and their ideology drove them to overcome their liberal enemies and aid Japan
as it embarked on a path of imperial domination.

The Soviet Union
The Party also had formidable domestic circumstances to contend with. For Homo
Sovieticus, a new species of man that emerged in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, living conditions
were unimaginable.60 In urban areas, there was a severe housing crisis, as ten million peasants
abandoned the countryside and sought work in the cities. The people were crowded into communal
apartments, dormitories, and barracks. With massive shortages of primary goods, it was nearly
impossible to obtain necessities such as bread, milk, and butter. Staples like salt, soap, and
kerosene became luxuries. Hats and shoes were often indulgences. Urban services were nonexistent, resulting in a monstrous filth and repugnance. As an American working in the Soviet
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Union at this time said, “Stench, filth, dilapidation batter the sense at every turn.”61 The darkened
streets were overrun with gangs of homeless children and drunken workers, and “Robberies,
murders, drunken fights, and random attacks on passerby were common.”62
In industrial settlements like Magnitogorsk, along with the appalling working and living
conditions, there was sickness and disease. The “classrooms” where workers sought socialist
enlightenment were usually decrepit barracks without heat or running water.63 Most workers toiled
for twelve hours each day on empty stomachs in the freezing cold. They lacked proper boots and
gloves, and because supplies such as lumber and light bulbs were unavailable, workers had to
navigate dizzying heights without scaffoldings and work in the dark.64 Workers suffered horrific
injuries and were forced to endure excruciating pain before finally dying in the cold and dirty
hospitals where the nurses, “had become completely indifferent to the pain and suffering they saw
around them.”65
But with capitalism in crisis as a result of the Great Depression, and with fascism and
Nazism on the ascendant, Homo Sovieticus maintained faith in the promise of a utopian future.
“We’ll all have automobiles,” said one worker in Magnitogorsk. “Just wait five or ten years and
we won’t need one single thing from the capitalist world,” said another. 66 Although not everyone
understood the ideological nuances of Hegelian dialectics, they were building socialism, the very
antithesis of capitalism, a new type of civilization and the embodiment of the Enlightenment
dream.67 In the present they would suffer, but in time, with hard work and patience, the Soviet
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Union would achieve a superior form of modernity and high international status while the people
would enjoy social welfare, full employment, child care, health care, retirement pensions, free
education, and the promise of advancement in the workforce.68
In the 1930s, Stalinism was much more than a political ideology – it was an experiment in
popular participation and a new way of organizing society. It was a forward-looking and
progressive civilization, “a set of values, a social identity, a way of life.”69 Settlements like
Magnitogorsk were much more than worksites for men and blast furnaces; they were physical
manifestations of a “grand historical endeavor”70 that transcended the drive for rapid
industrialization and encompassed everything from housing and education to styles of dress,
modes of reasoning, and uses of language. Magnitogorsk was a unique and distinctive example of
Stalinism, not as a totalitarian nightmare but as a rationally organized and socially transformative
civilization.
It was a work in progress, and Stalin, as leader of the Soviet Union, was tasked with
protecting and safeguarding the great socialist experiment. The situation was precarious.
Opposition within the Party argued for abandoning Stalinism and taking a different path. 71 The
people still had their faith, but with such dire living conditions and the onset of ambivalence,
confusion, and disappointment, it would only take a spark to ignite reactionary rebellion and engulf
the revolution.72 The kulaks were returning to their farms, criminals were wreaking havoc in the
cities, and the men who heroically defeated their foes in the Revolution and Civil War were
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growing tired and weary.73 The ideal of a united proletarian identity was still only a dream, as the
non-Russian nationalities throughout the Soviet Union desperately clung to their ethnic and
historical roots.74 Hundreds of thousands of Party members were nothing more than uneducated
opportunists, incapable of enlightenment and unqualified to help move the Soviet Union into its
next stage of development.75 And these were only the domestic circumstances Stalin had to deal
with. Beyond the Soviet borders, from East to West, Stalin was facing capitalist encirclement and
fascist expansionism.76 War was coming. To survive the onslaught and lead the Soviet Union into
its radiant future, Stalin took action. By the time of the Great Terror in 1936, Soviet officials had
expelled nearly one million people from the Party, the secret police had arrested and convicted
hundreds of thousands, and OGPU executioners had shot tens of thousands.77 But this was only
the beginning. By the mid to late 1930s, the threat of a second great war compelled Stalin to expand
his scope and intensify his methods.

Conclusion
In an essay focusing on the interwar period for The Oxford Handbook of European History,
Paul Hagenloh argued that violence was “the natural mode of state administration at the time.” 78
Throughout the interwar period, violence begot more violence. As Hagenloh states, “The entire
continent was so awash with violence in the early twentieth century – world war, civil wars, labour
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camps, and mass repressions.”79 Hagenloh identifies three central features of the interwar period:
constructive projects designed to mold society into the ideological ideal, excision of those deemed
unworthy from the body politic, and popular political participation. These three features were
common throughout Europe and around the world, and all three features, which often overlapped
in practice, involved the application of violence to various degrees. In Romania, for example,
ordinary citizens participated in the political process by joining fascist groups and organizations.
Some even joined fascist death squads that assassinated political enemies, eliminating those
deemed unworthy of a place in their utopian future. And some of these ordinary citizens were also
members of the intelligentsia that designed biopolitical projects with the aim of realizing the
national mission, manifesting the ideal of a Greater Romania peopled by a race of strong and noble
Romanians. The same pattern emerges in modern states around the world.
In nations as diverse as France, Italy, Germany, Romania, Japan, and the Soviet Union,
despite political and ideological differences, state policies and practices were remarkably similar.
All were seeking to create a new world order out of the mass destruction and devastation of World
War I, and all were driven by a belief that they were tasked with saving civilization from extinction.
This was the age of ideology – ideology not as an exercise in philosophical musing, but as a matter
of life and death. Political violence, various forms of social engineering, and murder of one’s
enemies were all employed throughout the interwar period. What separated states like the Soviet
Union, Germany, and Italy was not the policies and practices employed, but rather the extension
and expansion of those policies and practices. Seen from this perspective, Stalin’s Great Terror,
rather than being singled out as a malevolent aberration, is placed on a continuum of modern
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statecraft that defined the interwar world. When faced with potentially catastrophic foreign and
domestic circumstances, Stalin was compelled to take decisive action.
All of this leads to an important question: Why did these particular circumstances compel
Stalin to initiate his blood purges? The answer takes us back to the “fifth column” theory. With
growing opposition and discontent within the Soviet Union and fascism on the ascendant without,
the Party was vulnerable, susceptible to attack. Speaking of the situation several decades after the
fact, one of Stalin’s closest advisors, Vyacheslav Molotov said, “Nineteen thirty-seven was
necessary. If you consider that after the revolution we were slashing left and right, and we were
victorious, but enemies of different sorts remained, and in the face of impending fascist aggression
they might unite… they would falter and switch sides… you couldn’t count on them at a time of
crisis.”80 Another member of Stalin’s inner circle, Lazar Kagonovich, said that the mass
repressions were “a struggle against a ‘fifth column’ that came to power in Germany under
Hitlerite fascism and was preparing war against the land of Soviets.”81
Wendy Goldman has argued that “The Soviet Union in the late 1930s was a society
threatened by external enemies. Fascism was ascendant in Germany, Austria, Italy, Hungary, and
Spain, and Hitler’s armies were moving east.”82 The belief within the Soviet Union was that fascist
sympathizers had infiltrated the Party and nearly all Soviet institutions. Others, either sympathetic
to fascist ideology or antagonistic to the Communist Party, were thought to be lying in wait for the
opportunity to betray the Soviet Union. Collectively, these people made up the “fifth column.”
With a second great war looming on the horizon, targeting them as enemies of the people was a
preemptive strike.
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The threat was much greater than the rise of European fascism. Tensions in the Far East
reached new heights in the late 1930s after Japan invaded China. Stalin quickly signed a nonaggression treaty with China, clearly aimed at Japan, and began exiling the Korean population
from Far eastern territories, with the goal of “stopping the infiltration of Japanese espionage.”83
Spies and potential spies were infiltrating the Soviet Union from both east and west. And Stalin,
who had experienced the apocalyptic destruction of World War I, the Russian Revolution, and the
Russian Civil War, along with the horrifying famines and epidemics brought on by prolonged war
and conflict, was determined to prevent such devastation from consuming the Soviet Union and
eradicating the revolution.
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CHAPTER 4 “THE GREAT TERROR”
Who’s going to remember all this riffraff in ten or twenty years time? No one. Who remembers
now the names of the boyars Ivan the Terrible got rid of? No one.1

“Wreckers, diversionists, spies, and killers”2
On the afternoon of August 23rd, 1936, in the October Hall of the House of Unions, all eyes
were on comrade V.V. Ulrich, President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the
USSR. Before him stood sixteen defendants, accused of conspiring with fascist and capitalist
powers to assassinate Joseph Stalin, the Soviet Union’s supreme leader. The prosecution had
argued that these men had not only plotted to murder Stalin and other Party leaders, but also to
spurn the revolution and restore capitalism in Russia.
In a world so often veiled in secrecy, this trial was highly publicized, covered by media
outlets across the globe. One of the reasons for the fascination was that some of the accused were
high-ranking Party members. Grigory Zinoviev was one of the founding fathers of the Soviet
Union, a member of the first Politburo, and head of the Communist International. He had also been
a close personal friend of Vladimir Lenin. Lev Kamenev, another member of the first Politburo,
like Zinoviev, had worked closely with Lenin during the Russian Revolution and Civil War,
helping to establish the Bolsheviks as undisputed masters of the new Russian state. Both men, per
the prosecution, were involved in a “Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Center.”3
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White Corinthian columns and light-blue walls adorned the October Hall. Scattered
throughout, along with the thirty foreign journalists and diplomats who had been there for the past
week covering this extraordinary story, sat 150 Soviet citizens, most of whom were actually
NKVD clerks and officials. NKVD officers, armed with rifles and bayonets, escorted the prisoners
to the dock, as Ulrich, a fat, slovenly man with a shaven head, prepared himself to read the verdict.4
Just past 2:30 PM, he stood to pronounce the sentence; above him, hanging from the rafters, as if
to evoke moral authority over the proceedings, swayed colossal banners with the portraits of Marx,
Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. All sixteen defendants were found guilty. They had “perpetrated the
foul murder of Comrade S.M. Kirov” and organized terrorist groups with the goal of assassinating
Stalin. Kirov’s murder was central to the case. As the Party leader in Leningrad, Kirov was a
powerful and influential man. His assassination was such a shock that Stalin himself became
personally involved in the investigation.5
As Ulrich continued, it became clear that the “evidence” proved both Zinoviev and
Kamenev were following instructions from Leon Trotsky, Stalin’s bitter rival following the death
of Lenin, whose ultimate goal was to destroy the Soviet Union. All sixteen men were sentenced
“the supreme penalty – to be shot, and all property belonging to them to be confiscated.”6 When
Ulrich finished reading the verdict, prosecutor Andrei Vyshinsky delivered the trial’s concluding
speech. “Before us are criminals,” bellowed Vyshinsky with rage and indignation, “dangerous,
hardened, cruel and ruthless towards our people and towards our ideals, towards the leaders of our
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struggle, the leaders of the land of Soviets, the leaders of the toilers of the world!” He finished the
speech with an impassioned plea for justice: “I demand that dogs gone mad should be shot!”7
Within days, officers of Stalin’s secret police executed all sixteen men. These officers,
members of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, abbreviated NKVD, would have a
central role to play in the events that would soon immerse the Soviet Union in over two years of
unfathomable terror and repression. Following the executions, Nikolai Ezhov, an NKVD official
who helped organize the trial, took each spent bullet, wrapped it in paper, and labeled it with every
victim’s name.8
Zinoviev and Kamenev were the first victims. Why would they betray the Party and their
own people? These men were once devoted to the Revolution; men who sacrificed so much over
the years in the service of the Bolshevik cause. Why would they take part in such a hideous plot?
What the foreign journalists and diplomats did not see were the days and nights leading up to their
signed confessions. In dark, musty cells, as August’s sweltering summer heat intensified, agents
subjected Zinoviev, who was ill at the time, to all-night interrogations. Already deprived of sleep
and suffering from his illness, NKVD chief Genrikh Yagoda turned the heat on in Zinoviev’s cell.
Yagoda and his agents then focused their attention on Kamenev, threatening to murder his son.
Finally, when the two could no longer endure any more abuse, they agreed to confess, with the
guarantee that their lives, the lives of their family members, and the lives of their supporters would
be spared.9 More than this, even under such remarkable circumstances, a curious belief helped men
like Zinoviev and Kamenev make their fateful decision to confess: “The Party is always right.” 10
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Of course the guarantee meant nothing. Shortly after his own execution, Kamenev’s 16-year-old
son, not a defendant at the trial but accused of collaborating with the enemy, was shot in the head
by NKVD officers.11
By the end of 1938, NKVD agents would execute nearly 700,000 men, women, and
children.12 An estimated 300,000 more died in the Gulag camps. Were they all guilty of plotting
to murder Stalin and restore capitalism in Russia by working with the fascist powers of Europe?
Was Stalin a paranoid madman, finding conspiracies behind every corner, plots that threatened to
pollute and corrupt the hearts and minds of loyal Soviet citizens? Who were the victims? The
“Trial of the Sixteen” was only the first of three spectacular trials that captivated audiences around
the world. Through these trials, Stalin laid the groundwork that allowed him to purge tens of
thousands of Party members, government officials, industrial managers, and Red Army generals,
admirals, commissars, and officers. This was the first wave of the Great Terror, the blood purge of
the “old guard.”

The Old Guard and the Hunt for Enemies of the People
Stalin was not pleased with the way the media covered the first trial. He complained to
comrades Lazar Kagonovich and Vyacheslav Molotov, “Pravda failed to produce a single article
that provided a Marxist explanation of the process of degradation of these scum.” It was not, Stalin
went on, about a struggle for political power, but “a struggle against the Soviets, a struggle against
collectivization, against industrialization, a struggle, consequently, to restore capitalism in the
towns and villages of the USSR.” Pravda should have said, “Whoever fights against the Party and
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the government in the USSR stands for the defeat of socialism and the restoration of capitalism.”
Anyone who opposed the Party, Stalin believed, was a counterrevolutionary enemy of the state.
After all, Stalin continued, “Lenin said that if a faction or factions persist in their errors in their
struggle against the Party, under the Soviet system, they will, without fail, slide down to the level
of White Guardism, the defense of capitalism, a struggle against the Soviets, and must without fail,
merge with the enemies of Soviet rule.”13 Stalin reached his conclusions on the role of opponents
based on Lenin’s condemnation of factions at the Tenth Party Congress in 1921.14 The formula
was clear and distinct – those who opposed the Party opposed the Soviet Union.15
The sixteen executed following the first Moscow show trial represented the “LeftistOpposition,” those who believed Stalin was too conservative and wanted the Soviet Union to take
more radical action on the world stage in its efforts to advance the cause of socialism.16 By late
September 1936, Nikolai Ezhov was the new NKVD chief. Stalin believed Yagoda was incapable
of rooting out the Soviet Union’s hidden enemies. Ezhov, a former factory worker, known by his
friends as “Nicky the bookworm,” organized a second trial. 17 Working closely with Stalin, who
was undoubtedly the mastermind of the show trials and who controlled Ezhov’s every move, the
NKVD chief targeted new enemies and uncovered new plots that threatened the security of the
Soviet Union.18 Only a few months later, in January 1937, the second show trial began. This time
the accused represented the Communist managerial elite.19 Now seventeen new defendants faced

13

“Stalin to Kagonovich and Molotov,” Marxists Internet Archive, 1936. <www.marxists.org> (July 8, 2017).
Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: The Free Press, 1994),
167.
15
Richard Pipes writes that Lenin feared allowing the opposition a voice would “dilute the movement’s
revolutionary zeal as well as rob the party of its greatest asset, which was disciplined unity.” Richard Pipes, Three
“Whys” of the Russian Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 78.
16
Getty and Naumov, 4.
17
Getty and Naumov, 1.
18
Nicolas Werth, “A State Against Its People: Violence, Repression, and Terror in the Soviet Union,” in The Black
Book of Communism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 190.
19
Fitzpatrick, 195.
14

73

Ulrich and Vyshinsky. Like the first trial, as NKVD clerks and officials filled the seats, journalists
and diplomats from all over the world watched as the cameras rolled.
All seventeen confessed. Former leftist leaders Geogry Piatkov and Karl Radek were
highly respected and distinguished Party members, but Ezhov, reveling in his role as savior of the
people, declared, “These swine must be strangled!”20 NKVD officers proceeded to shoot thirteen
of the defendants. Four others, including Radek, died in the Gulag. According to newspaper
reports, the Russian people, like much of the Western world, watched the trial unfold in dismay.
The language was loaded – spies, wreckers, saboteurs, masked enemies. . . . Authorities urged
Soviet citizens to be aware of enemies posing as socialists, pretending to be loyal Soviet citizens
when in fact what they really wanted was to destroy the Party and restore capitalism in Russia.
They were urged to participate in the hunt for masked enemies of the people. In urban centers like
Moscow and Leningrad, fear and paranoia enveloped the factories, the universities, and even the
communal apartments.21 No one was safe. No one could be trusted. The friendly neighbor, the
hard-working employee, the smiling young man at the newsstand – they could all be spies, in the
service of fascist monsters, plotting to destroy the Soviet Union and murder its leaders.
Not even the Red Army, protectors of the toilers of the earth and guardians of the people,
could escape the crimson madness.22 By the time the Terror had concluded in 1938, Stalin arrested
or purged up to 35,000 men from the Red Army.23 Many were high-ranking generals and admirals,
including Marshal M.N. Tukhachevsky, Deputy Commissar of Defense. NKVD agents arrested
Tukhachevsky, along with seven other senior officers of the Red Army, in June 1937. Charged
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with treason as spies for Germany and Japan, the officers endured several days of brutal
interrogations before finally confessing. All eight were shot.24
Ezhov purged the NKVD as well, arresting over 2000 former lieutenants and NKVD
leaders. Accused of spying for Germany and plotting to overthrow the Soviet Union from within,
most were shot.25 The majority of those purged from the NKVD were Yagoda’s men, who quickly
fell under suspicion when Yagoda himself was arrested in March 1937. Stalin was meticulous,
targeting every institution that had any impact on life in the USSR. The NKVD, the Red Army,
the Party, industrial management – all were purged in a colossal coup d’état carried out by Stalin
and his leadership group.26 The purpose was to remove all opposition and renovate the Party.27
Stalin had a plan, and the spectacle of show trials and Red Army purges was only his first step.
The third and final show trial took place in March 1938. This was the “Trial of 21,” the
“Rightist-Opposition” who considered Stalin too radical. Again, many Party elites found
themselves fighting for their lives. The celebrated Nikolai Bukharin, along with Aleksei Rykov,
Mikhail Tomsky, and former NKVD chief Genrikh Yagoda were all accused of being
“Trotskyites” and planning to murder Stalin and destroy the Soviet Union. NKVD officers
threatened to murder Bukharin’s wife and infant son.28 Hoping to save his family, he finally
confessed on March 12th. Bukharin admitted everything – the struggle against the Party and the
Soviet government, the counterrevolutionary plots to betray his country, the organizing of kulak
uprisings. In his own words, he was “responsible for a grave and monstrous crime against the
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socialist fatherland and the whole international proletariat.”29 He was quickly executed, along with
Rykov, Tomsky, and Yagoda.30
The NKVD’s chief executioner was Vasily Blokhin, who personally shot most of the highprofile defendants. Men like Zinoviev, Kamenev, Tukhachevsky, Bukharin, and Yagoda were
most likely killed by Blokhin. He also murdered thousands of workers and peasants by the time
his bloody and fiendish career came to an end. During the Great Terror, Blokhin commanded an
execution squad in Moscow. A few years later, in 1940, at the site of the notorious Katyn massacre,
Blokhin was stationed in Kalinin. Every night Blokhin shot approximately 250 men, one after
another, draped in his gore splattered leather cap, apron, and long gloves.31
On the streets of urban centers like Leningrad and Moscow, the Terror engulfed tens of
thousands of ordinary citizens. The newspapers fueled the flames. Every day stories about
unmasking enemies and spies filled the papers.32 They quoted defendants from the show trials, the
“wreckers” on trial for plotting to destroy the Soviet Union from within, who warned that “soon
our workers will perish in the mines like rats.”33 Soviet citizens devoted themselves to hunting for
internal, masked adversaries. In the factories, workshops were held to educate workers on ways
to recognize the masked enemies.34 Local papers proclaimed, “The task of every honest Soviet
citizen is to know how to unmask enemies in any mask, to discern and to prevent their insidious,
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traitorous activities.”35 The hunt for enemies, which was sparked by Party directives and mass
campaigns, soon resulted in a wave of denunciations, as workers denounced factory managers,
students denounced professors, and Communists denounced fellow Communists.36 Millions of
ordinary people, immersed in this climate of “spy mania,” actively participated in the hunt and
helped sustain the political culture of mass fear and terror.37 American papers, struggling to
understand the chaos and confusion that seemed to be consuming the Soviet Union, spoke of the
“Salem witch-hunt of Bolshevism.”38
Stalin’s speech at the March Plenum in 1937 initiated the manic hunt for spies and traitors.
He talked about the “incontrovertible facts” that enemies of the people played active roles in
undermining the Soviet Union’s economic and administrative institutions, that they had penetrated
all levels of government, including the Party itself. He condemned leading comrades who failed
to recognize the wreckers and spies, arguing that their failures to protect the fatherland resulted
from carelessness, complacency, and naivety. These comrades had failed to “recognize the wolves
in sheep’s clothing and were unable to tear away their masks.”39
During the June Plenum of the Central Committee, Ezhov announced that he had
discovered a grand conspiracy, the “center of centers.” The conspiracy, Ezhov argued, which
united leftists, rightists, Trotskyists, members of former socialist parties, army officers, NKVD
officers, and foreign communists, had infiltrated the Red Army, military intelligence, the
Comintern, the commissariats of foreign affairs, transport, and agriculture.40 Spies were
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everywhere, masked as loyal Communists, and their ultimate purpose was the destruction of the
USSR.
Although the theatrics of the show trials deceived many people around the world, not all
Western journalists believed the tale of internal plots and conspiracies. Some condemned the
“Dictator Joseph V. Stalin” who used Soviet firing squads to eliminate his enemies.41 Some spoke
of Stalin’s “oriental despotism” and the “primitive” and “malleable” Soviet people that allowed
themselves to be enslaved by such a cruel tyrant.42 Others looked to former Russian luminaries for
insight. Leon Trotsky, who had fled to Mexico, took every opportunity to deny the charges against
him and denounce Stalin, maintaining that Russia had “betrayed the faith of Marx and Lenin.” 43
Former leader of the Provisional Government Alexander Kerensky, who achieved cult-like status
following the Russian Revolution,44 spoke of the “moral bankruptcy of Bolshevism.” He said the
world needed to know that there were daily mass executions in Russia and that the charges were
“frame-ups, lies and falsifications.” Stalin, through his “rule of fear and terror,” had already
confined five million victims to prison and concentration camps.45 As the West learned of Ezhov’s
purge of the NKVD, stories appeared that accused the Soviet Union of being not a socialist state,
but a totalitarian regime guilty of criminal tyranny. In an environment where those responsible for
obtaining confessions were now confessing themselves, no one’s honor, liberty, or life was safe.46
The purge of the old guard and the hunt for enemies of the people completely enveloped
the Soviet Union for nearly two years. It presented Stalin and the Party with an opportunity to
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educate the people on the dangers and threats that had the potential to destroy the USSR.47 But this
first wave of mass repression and terror served another, more diabolical purpose: to divert and
distract both the citizens of the Soviet Union and the rest of the world from what was really going
on. In fact, the veil was not lifted until Nikita Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech” in 1956, when the
newly appointed leader of the USSR condemned Stalin.48 And even then, the true extent of the
blood purges remained a state secret.
Nearly a year before the conclusion of the last Moscow show trial, Stalin and Ezhov
initiated the “mass operations.”49 These operations were not covered in the papers. It took several
decades until the Western world even learned of their existence. 50 Even though the first wave of
violence that washed over the Soviet Union led to the executions of 40,000 people, the Great Terror
did not truly begin until the Politburo released its resolution “On Anti-Soviet Elements” on 2 July,
1937.51

00447 and the Kulak Operations
Andrei Grigor’evich Nademskii was an Orthodox priest at the Vydubychi-Heorhii church
in Kiev. On 20 December, 1937, NKVD agents arrested Nademskii and charged him with “antiSoviet agitation.” His interrogator claimed that the priest had called the Communists barbarians
and referred to the NKVD as Satan. He had also told people that when the Soviet regime fell they
would be severely punished for their transgressions. When asked to confess, Nademskii replied,
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“I never conducted any anti-Soviet activity… I am an apolitical person and never discuss political
subjects with any of my acquaintances.” Upon hearing Nademskii’s denial, the interrogator, who
had been writing the confession in longhand, took out a clean sheet of paper and asked the priest,
once again, to admit his guilt.
NKVD agents soon extracted the desired confession, most likely under torture. Now
Nademskii said, “Yes, I am forced to confess that being oppressed by the Soviet regime, I told
some individual priests and clergy about my anti-Soviet sentiments.” Two witnesses confirmed
Nademskii’s guilt. Whether or not they too were forced to provide statements or had personal
grudges against the priest is unknown. Either way, the NKVD officer had what he needed. Less
than three weeks later, the sixty-nine-year old Nademskii was shot in the head and thrown into a
mass grave in Bykivnia.52
Nademskii was only one of the hundreds of thousands of men and women targeted as a
result of order 00447. On 30 July, 1937, Mikhail Frinovskii, Ezhov’s personal assistant, presented
Stalin with the operational order titled “Regarding Operations of Repression of Former Kulaks,
Criminals, and Other Anti-Soviet Elements.” The Politburo swiftly approved the order and
authorized Ezhov to proceed by sending instructions to regional NKVD and Party administrators.53
Those targeted as criminals could be horse and cattle thieves, robbers who had escaped Soviet
penal institutions, or anyone who had dealings with the judicial system in the past. 54 The antiSoviet elements could be church officials, former White officers, former Socialist Revolutionaries
or Mensheviks who had opposed the Bolsheviks, former tsarist officials, political prisoners being
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held in the Gulag, or anyone who the local NKVD had a file on, like Nademskii who had been
arrested twice before in 1922 and 1930.55
Ezhov directed local authorities to register criminal offenders and kulaks. He also directed
them to establish local tribunals, “troikas,” comprised of regional bosses to decide who was to be
sent to the Gulag and who was to be shot.56 The troikas usually consisted of the local NKVD chief,
the local procurator, and the secretary of the regional Party.57 Order 00447 specified that each
province, territory, and republic had a quota to meet. In total, the order suggested that after four
months there should be 268,950 arrests and 72,950 executions.58 Stalin and his inner circle tightly
controlled the measures to achieve these goals – the Politburo issued instructions and approved
NKVD orders, quotas established in Moscow governed the actions of the troikas, the Military
Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court dealt with high-profile arrests, and Stalin, along with his
leadership group comprised of Molotov, Vorshilov, Kagonovich, and Zhadnov, oversaw the entire
process.59
Order 00447 was carried out in secret.60 NKVD agents tortured suspected enemies to elicit
confessions, and once the confessions were secured, they used Nagan pistols to shoot their victims
in the head. The methods of torture varied, but in most cases prisoners were deprived of sleep,
forced to stand for endless hours, and beaten until they confessed. NKVD agents also plunged
prisoners’ heads into latrines. Stalin, who was briefed by Ezhov on an ongoing basis, approved
these methods.61
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NKVD officers targeted the criminal elements in urban areas, focusing on bandits, armed
robbers, organized and professional criminals, and recidivists. They also sought out homeless
children with histories of hooliganism.62 The kulaks (who had survived revolution,
collectivization, famine, exile, and the Gulag) presented a more difficult problem to solve.63
Collectivization and “dekulakization” affected millions of families throughout the USSR. Many
of these former kulaks began returning to their native lands by the mid-1930s, hoping to recover
their confiscated property and reestablish some of their former authority and influence. 64 Those
who had been exiled or imprisoned began returning to the collective farms. Others headed for
urban areas and began blending in with the working classes.65 The great fear for Stalin and the
Party was that these former kulaks would incite the people to rebellion.66
All of these contingents – kulaks, criminals, and other anti-Soviet elements – represented
a potential social base of insurrection.67 In the event of another great war, this base could destroy
the Soviet Union from within. The kulaks still in camps and in Siberian exile could potentially
support a Japanese invasion.68 An NKVD report in 1937 stated that these kulaks constituted “a
broad base on which to build an insurgent rebellion.”69 But an even greater threat was found to the
west, in Soviet Ukraine where former kulaks could support a German invasion. This region became
the major killing center, where NKVD officers executed 70,868 people in response to order
00447.70
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Stalin increased local and regional quotas, far exceeding the original goals laid out by
Frinovskii and Ezhov. In total, order 00447 resulted in 385,000 executions. Additionally, 316,000
more people were sent to the Gulag.71 But the Great Terror was far from over. The USSR faced
other potential threats, and Stalin was determined to eliminate all possible enemies before they had
the opportunity to betray the fatherland. The “National Operations” targeted ethnic contingents,
leaving non-Russian nationalities across the Soviet Union vulnerable and helpless, susceptible to
the blood purges that had already claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of men, women, and
children, both the prominent and the obscure.

The National Operations
In 1936, Maria Juriewicz was a young woman living in Leningrad with her two sisters.
Falling in love, she married Stanislaw Wyganowski. For reasons unknown to either the Juriewicz
family or Stanislaw, NKVD officers arrested Maria in August, 1937. Stanislaw, hoping to find out
why his wife had been arrested, inquired with the local authorities. But he was also arrested, and
a few weeks later NKVD agents showed up at the Juriewicz family home and arrested one of
Maria’s other sisters, Elzbieta. Without any explanation, without any proof of guilt, and without
any form of legal proceedings, Stanislaw, Maria, and Elzbieta were all shot and buried in mass
graves.
During the course of the national operations, 6,597 Soviet citizens were shot in the
Leningrad region. Many, like Stanislaw, Maria, and Elzbieta, lost their lives for no reason other
than their Polish ethnicity. When Ezhov reported on his progress in the operation – 23,216 arrests
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after only twenty days – Stalin responded, “Very good! Keep on digging up and cleaning out this
Polish filth.”72
Even though the national operations were not talked about in the papers, people understood
that something ominous was happening in their cities, towns, and villages. Individuals would
simply disappear. Family members were told they had been sentenced to ten years in the Gulag
with no right for correspondence.73 In the early morning hours, small black vans patrolled the
streets. These were the notorious Black Marias, or “black ravens.” Once they arrived at their
desired destination, NKVD officers would exit the truck and knock on the door. Everyone knew
what happened next: once arrested, most were never to be seen or heard from again.74
Many were taken to buildings and led into basements where agents would torture them
until they confessed to crimes such as sabotage, terrorism, or espionage. The goal of the agents
was to force people to confess that there was a Polish conspiracy, a master plan to destroy the
USSR. In places like Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Belarus, officers perfected the “conference
method.” They would fill a basement with a large number of Poles and torture one person, forcing
the others to watch. Once this victim confessed, the others were told that they had a choice – they
could confess or be tortured. In these cases, most people confessed and the agents were able to
secure more “evidence” in support of the Polish conspiracy theory.75
The national operations began on 9 August, 1937, when the Politburo approved the NKVD
order “On Liquidating Polish Sabotage-Espionage Groups.” This order, 00485, provided the
framework for dealing with “counterrevolutionary national contingents.” The Poles were not the
only targets: other orders quickly followed 00485 and identified other groups that needed to be
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repressed, including Germans, Romanians, Latvians, Estonians, Finns, Greeks, Afghans, Iranians,
Chinese, Bulgarians, and Macedonians.76 This was an unprecedented step for Stalin and his
leadership group, a step that transformed and radicalized the Terror. The targets were no longer
“class enemies,” such as kulaks, but national groups specifically targeted as enemies of the
people.77
Once again, the great fear for Stalin was that these groups would support the Germans or
the Japanese in the event of an invasion. Their very presence was a national security threat. 78 At
this point, a second world war seemed inevitable. The logic was simple – if these populations were
removed, either through executions, deportations, or incarcerations, then the Germans and
Japanese would find no support in the Soviet Union.79 If they remained, they could potentially
become spies and collaborators.80 The ideal of an empire of nations had been replaced with
explicitly pro-Russian sentiments and policies. By the beginning of 1938, the Russian language
was made compulsory in all Soviet schools.81
Ordered to “destroy the Poles entirely,” NKVD officers used any available method to
locate their targets. Some officers even searched for names that sounded Polish in the city records,
found their addresses, and showed up on their doorsteps with the Black Marias.82 By the time the
national operations concluded, nearly 240,000 people had been shot.83 The USSR was supposed
to be a multicultural and multiethnic state.84 In an interview with Roy Howard in 1936, Stalin
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proclaimed that in the Soviet Union there was no oppression of nationalities. He boasted about the
constitution, telling Howard that “In my opinion our new Soviet constitution will be the most
democratic in the world.”85 By 1938, when the national operations finally concluded, NKVD
officers executed 85,000 Poles, 47,327 people in Soviet Ukraine, 17,772 in Soviet Belarus, 16,573
in Soviet Latvia, 9,078 in Finland, and 7,998 in Soviet Estonia.86 Countless others vanished in the
Gulag, died from torture, or perished while imprisoned.87 Over 170,000 Koreans were deported
from the Far East to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.88 Around 40,000 died following the deportation
because of malnutrition, disease, and other related causes.89 Had Stalin met his objective? Had he
succeeded in eliminating a possible base of insurrection, the potential “fifth column” that could
make the difference between victory and defeat in the next world war?90 For Stalin and the Soviet
Union, only time would tell.

“The Perverse Logic of Utopia”91
On 10 April , 1939, agents arrested Nikolai Ezhov, head of the Soviet Union’s secret police.
He spent the next year of his life in prison where he was subjected to the same brutal interrogation
techniques that he encouraged his officers to employ throughout the Great Terror. Now he too,
like so many before him, confessed to a litany of absurdities: being a Polish spy, a German spy
who had plotted to assassinate Stalin, a homosexual, and a Lithuanian. His father, Ezhov
confessed, was not really a former factory worker, but a brothel operator. And his mother, a bar
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hall dancer. At his trial, Ezhov retracted these false confessions and maintained his loyalty to the
Party and, above all else, his devotion to Stalin. On 2 February, 1940, immediately following the
trial, NKVD officers executed Ezhov.92
The Great Terror had officially ended in August, 1938. Stalin brought in L. P. Beria to be
Ezhov’s deputy, and in October and November a Politburo commission began investigating
NKVD “abuses.” Ezhov’s assistants were arrested and began testifying against their chief. Ezhov’s
wife committed suicide after she was accused of maintaining relationships with suspicious
contacts. Soon Ezhov was arrested and Beria took over his position as head of the NKVD.93
From the Kremlin in Moscow, Joseph Stalin had centrally orchestrated the Terror. From
beginning to end, he maintained absolute control of the bloody repressions that took the lives of
nearly 700,000 people.94 The Terror, among other things, was an attempt to cleanse the Soviet
Union of counterrevolutionary contingents. As a path to a radiant future and an all-encompassing
guide to action, ideology was the driving force of Stalin’s purges. The writings of Lenin and Marx,
specifically Marx’s and Engel’s Manifesto of the Communist Party, reveal an imperative to
eliminate certain groups from the body politic in order to realize a socialist society. 95 Stalin
believed it was essential to remove what he considered “socially dangerous” contingents from the
Soviet Union. This is the quintessence of Soviet ideology – class warfare and the need to eliminate
various classes and groups of people believed to pose a threat to socialism. This is made apparent
in the very first constitution under the new Bolshevik government in 1918. There would be asylum
for foreigners facing political oppression and inclusion of national minorities, but they would be
deprived of their rights if those individuals or groups acted “to the detriment of the socialist
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revolution.”96 The Terror, initiated by Stalin and carried out by NKVD agents, was an effort to
purify the USSR of those contingents that had the potential to undermine the revolution and
destabilize the USSR. This was a “free union of free nations,” until that freedom threatened the
Soviet experiment.97
The regime applied the counterrevolutionary label in two distinct ways: the first, on those
groups or individuals considered to pose a “potential” threat, and the second, following from
Marx’s theory of historical development, on those groups or classes sentenced by History to wither
and perish. These two often overlapped, as with former kulaks, for example, who were believed to
both pose a potential threat to the regime and had no place in the socialist utopia. The case of the
nationalities and ethnicities is somewhat unique because History did not sentence them to perish,
but to assimilate and merge with proletariat identity.98 Because this process of assimilation had
failed to take place by 1937, and since Stalin had neither the time nor the patience to wait for this
historical process to naturally occur, they too were deemed counterrevolutionary as a potential
fifth column in the event of war. Leading up to this point, it is important to remember, both Lenin
and Stalin believed the process of assimilation would occur naturally. The socialist state they had
created was anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist. They wished to incorporate national identities,
not oppress them and not force them to become something they were not, as Alexander III had
done with his “Russification” initiatives in the late 19th century. Circumstances intersected with
ideology, leading to changes in practices and policies.
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It is difficult to fathom, but when such logic was applied during the purges, men like
Andrei Grigor’evich Nademskii, the Orthodox priest from Kiev who was executed in 1938, and
women like Maria Juriewicz, the newlywed from Leningrad who was shot to death in 1937, were
in fact counterrevolutionaries – Nademskii because he was a priest and, according to Marx, there
would be no priests in the future utopia; Juriewicz because she was Polish, and again, according
to Marx, national identities were supposed to merge into a single, proletariat identity. In both cases,
they were not only potential threats to the revolution, but also sentenced by the supranatural force
of History to wither and die.
Because Soviet ideology followed from Marxism, a theoretical political philosophy that
projected and predicted future events, there was a profound emphasis placed on the process of
becoming, on the notion of potentiality. Former kulaks, recidivist criminals, and nationalities were
enemies because of what they might do under certain circumstances, such as the outbreak of
another great war, and what they had the potential to do if given the opportunity, such as if they
were given support from a foreign state opposed to the Soviet Union. Similarly, the idea of
revolution was framed as a force that was in constant and continuous motion, not simply as an
event that began when the Bolsheviks seized power in October 1917 and concluded when they
triumphed in the Civil War. The revolution was a process, a continuum, that would only conclude
when socialism reigned throughout the world. Enemies sought to disrupt this process by first
destroying the Party in the Soviet Union and then preventing it from spreading across Europe. For
the Soviet regime, led by men like Stalin, Ezhov, Molotov, and Kagonovich, these enemy
contingents had to be annihilated in order to save the revolution.
But if this true, then why not simply arrest and execute the accused? Why spend the time,
and the manpower, torturing and tormenting them, forcing them to sign the most absurd
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confessions? It is important to consider another important concept of Soviet ideology – the idea of
developing and evolving political consciousness. This process occurred through various forms of
education. The vanguard, or the Party, controlled the Soviet Union, but the millions of workers
and poor peasants were destined to evolve and govern the coming utopia. Like the symbolism
inherent on the Soviet flag, the Party rose above the masses of workers and poor peasants,
illuminating the path and guiding the way. The forced confessions had a specific purpose: to
educate and inform the populace. The lesson to be learned was that their nation was surrounded
by threats to the revolution, by enemies who wished to restore capitalism and once again enslave
the masses. The lesson was vigilance – traitors, spies, and wreckers were everywhere; to protect
their present order and ensure their radiant future, citizens needed to be proactive defenders of the
revolution.
The mass and national operations, however, present a more complex problem. There were
hundreds of thousands of forced confessions that were never made public. Why? What was the
purpose? Again, the answer rests on Soviet ideology. Unlike the Nazi regime who openly
employed mass terror and violence in their pursuit of social transformation, the Soviet Union was
predicated on the socialist ideals of rational progress and egalitarian ethics. Their rule could not
appear to be grounded in violence and repression. As Martin Malia wrote, “It was thus necessary
for the Soviets to make their ‘enemies’ confess to criminal actions and thereby recognize their
elimination as just and deserved.”99
Although the purge of the Leninist old guard and the hunt for enemies of the people was a
gruesome and bloody affair that destroyed tens of thousands of families throughout the USSR, it
pales in comparison, at least numerically, to the mass and national operations. Approximately
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40,000 from the old guard were shot.100 NKVD agents executed between 20,000 and 25,000 more
as a result of denunciations. Combined, these executions represent only 9% of the total number of
victims who lost their lives in the Great Terror. Theories arguing for mass participation are not
supported by the evidence. There was certainly participation in urban centers like Moscow and
Leningrad, where millions of people were caught up in the madness, as both Wendy Goldman and
Sheila Fitzpatrick have demonstrated, but denunciations played no part in either the national
operations or the kulak operations. These operations were initiated by Stalin and carried out by the
NKVD.101 When historians argue that the Terror actually began with the mass operations, it is
because 91% of the total number of victims, some 625,000 people, were executed during this
period of the purges – 385,000 from NKVD order 00447 and 240,000 from order 00485 and the
national operations.102 Nearly 390,000 more were sent to the Gulag.103 The total number of people
who died in the camps is still unknown.
Years later, Vyacheslav Molotov, one of the key members of Stalin’s inner circle, talked
about the blood purges. “I believe we had to pass through a period of terror,” Molotov said. “The
terror cost us dearly, but without it things would have been worse. Many people who should not
have been touched suffered… Stalin insisted on making doubly sure: spare no one, but guarantee
absolute stability in the country for a long period of time – through the war and postwar years,
which was certainly achieved.”104 This pragmatic, utilitarian reasoning was employed by Lenin
during the Civil War, as he used the Cheka to unleash the Red Terror, and by Stalin, nearly twenty
years later, during the Great Terror. In both cases, no one was spared – and in both cases stability
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followed. Of course, for Stalin, the Soviet Union would have to fight a second bloody world war
before the economic, political, and social stability could be experienced.
A remarkable 70% of purge victims had some form of higher education. 105 Stalin wanted
to eliminate all possible competing ideologies, worldviews, and nationalist movements. There
could be no opposition; there could be no factions. Another important consideration, and a crucial
one for Stalin, was the type of education. Even though a great majority of the Leninist old guard
employed in the Party, the army, the Komsomol, and the factories had some higher education, their
schooling had not been technical in nature. The future of the USSR, and the future of the world,
Stalin believed, would be driven by technically trained cadres. By purging Soviet institutions,
Stalin was able to fill the void with a new generation of technically trained men and women. As
Fainsod wrote in Smolensk Under Soviet Rule, with rapid industrialization in the early 1930s, there
was a desperate need for engineers and technicians, resulting in “an overhauling of the educational
system, an emphasis on technical training, and the growth of a new Soviet-trained technical
intelligentsia.”106 By the late 1930s, this new Soviet intelligentsia was ready to lead and guide the
USSR for the next fifty years.
Richard Pipes wrote, “It is entirely futile to seek any single explanation for major
occurrences.”107 To understand the Great Terror, a phenomenon defined by astonishing
complexity, it is necessary to explore a multitude of interpretations. But this too needs to be
questioned. Maybe the first and last place to look for an explanation is with the Party. As one of
the defendants in the Moscow show trials stated, “the slightest rift with the Party, the slightest
insincerity towards the Party, the slightest hesitation with regard to the leadership, with regard to
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the Central Committee, is enough to land you in the camp of counterrevolution.”108 The Party was
always right. If the Party said you were a counterrevolutionary, then you were a
counterrevolutionary. The Party, represented by Stalin and his inner circle, issued orders. NKVD
agents carried out the orders. There could be no debate.
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CHAPTER 5 “EPILOGUE”
“It is through madness that the greatest good things have come to Greece,” Plato said, in
concert with all ancient mankind. 1

On 25 February, 1956, Nikita Khrushchev delivered his notorious “Secret Speech” to the
Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. For several hours, Khrushchev
railed against the former General Secretary, criticizing the celebrated Stalin for his “glaring
violations of revolutionary legality.”2 Khrushchev argued that Stalin was directly responsible for
a brutal campaign of “mass repression and terror.”3 He accused the former Party leader of
employing “mass terror against the Party cadres.”4 As the dismayed delegates listened to the litany
of charges and accusations, Khrushchev proclaimed “that many entirely innocent persons, who in
the past had defended the Party line, became victims.”5 Providing details as to why so many highly
esteemed Party members had admitted to being spies, traitors, and wreckers, Khrushchev revealed
the use of the “barbaric tortures”6 that were systematically employed to secure admissions of guilt.
Khrushchev used the speech to personally rehabilitate many of victims of the Great Terror. But as
he finished naming several of the innocent Party members who had been executed, it became clear
that the most controversial victims of Stalin’s Terror would not be rehabilitated: Zinoviev,
Kamenev, and Bukharin. And Khrushchev concluded his speech without placing any blame or
responsibility on those members of Stalin’s inner circle who had helped him to plan and carry out
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the Terror: Molotov, Voroshilov, and Kagonovich.7 Was the speech a passionate condemnation of
Stalinism? Or was it a calculated political maneuver designed to empower Khrushchev and his
supporters?
By not rehabilitating men like Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Bukharin, the implication was that
they were in fact “enemies of the people.” And by focusing his speech on the crimes of Stalin, on
“Stalin’s despotism,”8 Khrushchev avoided discussing the profoundly positive effects the Stalinist
system had on the Soviet Union. Through rapid industrialization, collectivization, cultural
revolution, and mass purges, Stalin succeeded in building and defending socialism in Russia. From
1928 to 1940, industrialization grew at a remarkable rate of 12-14% per year, the urban population
doubled, and the number of workers doubled. In the same time span, heavy industry exploded,
with steel production increased fourfold, coal production increased fivefold, and the generation of
electrical power increased ninefold. By the end of World War II, the Soviet Union was the second
largest industrial power in the world.9 In analyzing the effects of the Great Terror, as a result of
applying a Western, deontological perspective, historians have focused almost entirely on the
tragic loss of life, largely ignoring the industrial and economic legacy of Stalinism.
After suffering early losses and defeats in the Second World War, the Soviet Union rallied
to crush Nazi Germany. One of main reasons for this was that the USSR’s production of planes,
tanks, and artillery far surpassed Germany’s.10 The Soviet Union emerged from the war victorious,
as one of the two world superpowers. The USSR now represented the great alternative to
capitalism, with its ability to withstand economic catastrophes such as the Great Depression and
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its capacity to defeat an international menace like Nazi Germany. Communism became a global
force, and the era of the Soviet empire had begun.11 The USSR now controlled the Baltic states of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, extended the Soviet border westward into eastern Europe, regained
territory, privilege, and influence in northeastern China and Korea, and reclaimed territory that
had been lost to Japan.12 In 1949, the Soviet Union, a nation that much of the Western world had
for decades regarded as “backwards,” successfully tested its first nuclear device. 13 With similar
socialist regimes soon founded in China and North Korea, the Soviet Union and the Communist
Party became “father of the peoples” to a third of humanity. 14 And not long after Khrushchev’s
speech, the Soviet Union led the way in the race to space, with the launching of Sputnik, the first
satellite, in 1957, completing the first moon landing in 1959, and successfully putting the first
man into space in 1961. Only twenty-five years earlier, on the eve of the Great Terror, Stalin spoke
of the dire state of Soviet technology, of the USSR’s scandalous backwardness.
How could such astounding advances occur in such a short period of time? The answer,
although disturbing on so many levels, is provided by examining the Great Terror. The NKVD
executed nearly 700,000 people during the course of the blood purges. Several hundred thousand
more died in the Gulag. The horrific violence and brutality tore apart countless families and
annihilated the dreams and aspirations of innumerable Soviet citizens. We will never know how
many wives became widows, how many children became orphans, and how many young men and
women forfeited their youth and vitality in the abominable abyss of the Soviet Gulag. But the
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historian, tasked with the analysis of causation, must look beyond the colossal moral transgressions
and try to understand how phenomena like the Great Terror affect state structures and institutions.
Socialism, as outlined by Marx and Engels, entails industrialization, urbanization, and a
preponderance of workers. All this, in turn, demands technically educated cadres. Leninism, as
expressed in the Tenth Party Congress, requires the elimination of all opposition – there can be no
dissent, no factions within the Party. Communism necessitates a unified political body, with all
members of the political community eventually identifying, through an evolutionary process, not
as various ethnic or national groups, but as Communist workers. And the Soviet Union, as the very
symbol of the socialist state and the realization of Marxism, needed as their impenetrable
foundation an army of workers and soldiers. Stalin, as a progressive, forward-looking leader,
understood that the masses of “anti-Soviet elements” – the kulaks, priests, and petty criminals –
had no place in the future Soviet state. Stalinism addressed all of these issues through its
revolutionary policies and programs.
A new generation of technically educated men and women replaced the old guard, building
the tanks and planes that would defeat Nazi Germany and designing the rockets and satellites that
would launch the Soviet Union beyond the Iron Curtain and into outer space. Ethnic populations
and national contingents that had the potential to revolt against the Soviet Union were repressed,
either through mass executions or mass deportations. The kulaks, with the potential to incite
rebellion amongst the Soviet Union’s immense rural population were also violently repressed.
When World War II broke out in 1939, and even as the USSR suffered devastating losses
throughout 1940 and 1941, there was no “fifth column” to rise up against the Communist Party.
For Stalin to build and defend socialism in Russia, and for the Soviet Union to become a global
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superpower, the Great Terror, although morally repulsive and ethically monstrous, was an absolute
necessity.
In the 1930s, a radicalized and militarized socialist ideology intersected with extremely
threatening foreign and domestic circumstances. The result of this intersection was the Great
Terror. The circumstances demanded a response; the ideology determined the response. To
transform the USSR into a global superpower, the Soviet state employed a number of radical
policies. Mass terror was one of these policies, the “crimson madness” that destroyed the lives of
hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens. But from this destruction emerged an immense
Communist empire. The telos had been realized.
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